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INTRODUCTION
The invention of computers, like all modern technologies, was
revolutionizing. 1 Modern storage mechanisms can contain the
equivalent of sixteen billion thick books. 2 One 2017 study found that
eighty-nine percent of consumers check their smartphones within an
hour of waking up and, on average, look at their phones
approximately forty-seven times each day (a statistic that rises to
eighty-six times a day for eighteen to twenty-four year olds). 3 Forbes
reports that, by 2020, about 1.7 megabytes of new information will be
created every second for every person, with total accumulated digital
data growing to around forty-four zettabytes, or forty-four trillion
gigabytes. 4 By that same year, the “Internet of Things” 5 will have
*

J.D., 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Fordham College at
Rose Hill. The author would like to thank Professor Deborah W. Denno, Arthur A.
McGivney Professor of Law, for her support and encouragement during the
production of this Note, his former cybercrime colleagues for both their training and
their continued guidance in preparing this Note for publication, and his friends and
family for providing thoughtful advice, edits, and assistance throughout this process.
1. See, e.g., Sherry Turkle, How Computers Change the Way We Think, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 30, 2004), https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-ComputersChange-the-Way/10192 [https://perma.cc/5K4K-9KQ2].
2. See Quentin Hardy, As a Data Deluge Grows, Companies Rethink Storage,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/technology/as-adata-deluge-grows-companies-rethink-storage.html [https://perma.cc/D8RA-6FWU].
3. See DELOITTE, GLOBAL MOBILE CONSUMER SURVEY: US EDITION, THE
DAWN
OF
THE
NEXT
ERA
IN
MOBILE
2
(2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/technology-mediatelecommunications/us-tmt-2017-global-mobile-consumer-survey-executivesummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX8D-PX24].
4. See Bernard Marr, Big Data: 20 Mind-Boggling Facts Everyone Must Read,
(Sept.
30,
2015,
2:19
AM),
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2015/09/30/big-data-20-mind-bogglingfacts-everyone-must-read [https://perma.cc/4DL6-RBMU]. To offer a sense of scale,
removable thumb drives available at retail stores typically range from about two
gigabytes to sixty-four gigabytes. Manufacturers estimate that a two-gigabyte flash
drive can store approximately 110 average-sized image files, five minutes of highdefinition video, and 125 MP3 files; a sixty-four-gigabyte flash drive can hold 2000
average-sized image files, 160 minutes of high-definition video, and 4000 MP3 files.
See, e.g., Number of Photos, Songs, Documents, and Video Hours a SanDisk Cruzer
SANDISK,
USB
Flash
Drive
Can
Hold,
https://kb.sandisk.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/462/~/number-of-photos%2Csongs%2C-documents%2C-and-video-hours-a-sandisk-cruzer-usb-flash
[https://perma.cc/PAE9-YNPR].
5. The “Internet of Things” is shorthand for the proliferation of ordinary objects
that are interconnected through the Internet, enabling them to send or receive data
and operate “intelligently” without human interaction. Examples range from a smart
thermostat or home appliance that can be controlled remotely and that may know the
optimal settings and schedule to minimize the homeowner’s energy consumption, to
wearable devices that collect and aggregate a person’s health data. The Internet of
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grown to over fifty billion connected devices worldwide. 6 Thus,
digital storage devices are, more and more, the spaces in which people
operate — replacing the hard-copy physical world of the past. Yet,
the innovators behind such creations are aware of basic human nature
and have historically employed a style of design in which digital
elements resemble real-world objects that anyone would recognize.7
What is now common was not always so familiar, 8 so technology
developers relied heavily upon real-world analogs — such as “files,”
“documents,” a “desktop,” “trash bins,” “tabs,” “folders,” and
“cutting and pasting” — to make computers more intuitive. 9 The
standard interface of a computer—what is called the Graphical User

Things can also have commercial applications, with industrial machinery operated
from a centralized command center rather than by factory workers physically present
on the factory floor. See Internet of Things, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/Internet_of_things
[https://perma.cc/F8CJ-KJRV]; see also Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The
Internet
of
Things’,
FORBES
(May
13,
2014,
12:05
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internetthings-that-anyone-can-understand/#14ef7da81d09 [https://perma.cc/CL8X-JA6K].
6. See Marr, supra note 4.
7. See Sam Judah, What Is Skeuomorphism?, BBC (June 13, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22840833 [https://perma.cc/7H6U-7TGF]. The
evolution of Apple’s line of iOS devices is the prototypical example of this principle.
The company has gained much attention for the way it has guided its users, teaching
them to operate its then-revolutionary touchscreen devices by employing many
skeuomorphic designs. By the time these devices were introduced, most consumers
of technology were accustomed to using a mouse and keyboard to control their
devices, so Apple had to train them to use a completely new interface. It chose to
construct its mobile operating system in a way that mirrored real-life, commonplace
things, allowing users to acquaint themselves with the new touch interface through
familiar elements. For example, memos appeared on virtual lined yellow paper, and
contacts appeared to be stored in a leather-bound book. After several years, the
company released a new operating system and abandoned most of its
skeuomorphism, opting, instead, for a more cutting-edge look. See also Kelsey
Campbell-Dollaghan, Skeuomorphism Will Never Go Away, and That’s a Good
Thing, GIZMODO (Oct. 3, 2014, 1:36 PM), http://gizmodo.com/skeuomorphism-willnever-go-away-and-thats-a-good-thin-1642089313
[https://perma.cc/9357-8XQM];
Austin Carr, Will Apple’s Tacky Software-Design Philosophy Cause a Revolt?, FAST
CO. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:45 AM), http://www.fastcodesign.com/1670760/will-applestacky-software-design-philosophy-cause-a-revolt
[https://perma.cc/SPP5-TWME];
Clive Thompson, Clive Thompson on Analog Designs in the Digital Age, WIRED
(Jan. 31, 2012, 12:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/01/st_thompson_analog/
[https://perma.cc/EM73-VVUZ].
8. For an entertaining clip of “Today Show” anchors Bryant Gumbel and Katie
Couric not understanding the Internet in 1994, see Flashback! TODAY Anchors
TODAY
(Jan.
26,
2015),
‘Discover’
the
Internet,
http://www.today.com/video/today/56868116 [https://perma.cc/MYQ4-CMSK].
9. See Campbell-Dollaghan, supra note 7; Carr, supra note 7; Judah, supra note
7; Thompson, supra note 7.
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Interface, or “GUI” 10 — is entirely skeuomorphic. 11 The computer
does not include any actual files, folders, documents, or images; there
are only ones and zeros, sectors and clusters, and magnetic platters
and actuator arms. 12
Historically, however, courts have not grappled with these distinct
characteristics of modern technologies and, instead, have relied too
heavily upon tempting but deceptive physical analogies. 13 But
computer searches are different from searches of physical locations in
many ways. Most importantly, they must be conducted by trained
forensic examiners who can protect the integrity of the original
evidence, as well as employ specialized techniques to detect erased,
protected, or otherwise-obfuscated files. 14 Objects are not merely
gathered and taken off-site but are carefully processed in a scientific
fashion. 15 It is a lengthy process, as the sizes of standard hard drives
and the amount of data being regularly generated have grown
exponentially and, therefore, take much longer to copy. 16 There are
also a number of technical reasons why law enforcement conducts a
bit-by-bit mirror of the source media as its regular practice. 17 Yet,
rather than assess the application of the law to the actual core
functioning of the relevant technologies, courts rely on seemingly
obvious stand-ins that are ultimately not apropos.

10. See
Graphical
User
Interface,
OXFORD
DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/graphical_user_interface
[https://perma.cc/F89V-VMWV].
11. A “skeuomorph” is “an object or feature which imitates the design of a similar
artifact made from another material.” Skeuomorph, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/skeuomorph [https://perma.cc/Q9MB7S7B]. In computing, the term specifically refers to “an element of a graphical user
interface which mimics a physical object.” Id.
12. See infra App.
13. See, e.g., Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001) (analogizing
password-protected computer files to a locked footlocker); United States v. Simons,
206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (analogizing the monitoring of employees’ Internet
use to random inspections of employees’ lockers); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 846 F. Supp. 11, 12–13 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (analogizing hard drives and other
storage media to filing cabinets of paper documents); United States v. Chan, 830 F.
Supp. 531, 534–35 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (analogizing a privacy expectation in certain
electronic data to that in a personal address book); United States v. David, 756 F.
Supp. 1385, 1390 (D. Nev. 1991) (equating a computer memo book with any other
closed container, finding them indistinguishable and subject to the same Fourth
Amendment protections).
14. See infra Section II.A and App.
15. Id.
16. See Hardy, supra note 2.
17. See infra Section II.A and App.
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A recent case in the Second Circuit provides a clear example of
when this “digital misunderstanding” inhibits the development of the
law. In United States v. Ganias, 18 the government conducted lawful
imaging of several of Stavros Ganias’s hard drives, retaining full
forensic copies containing data that were both responsive and nonresponsive to the initial search warrant. 19 Ganias later alleged that
the improper retention of the data — and, resultantly, a subsequent
search three years later that was only possible because of that
retention — violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. 20
While the Ganias court acknowledged the limitations of the ofteninvoked “filing cabinet” analogy, 21 it nonetheless failed to establish
the proper reasonableness standard for the search of lawfully seized
digital data. 22 The case evinces the complications that arise from
using pre-computer-age rules and procedures to address novel and
complex technological questions. Given the revolutionary nature of
today’s digital landscape, this Note argues that it is unwise to attempt
to force old frameworks onto non-analogous present-day situations.
With digital evidence now pervading virtually every type of criminal
prosecution, it is crucial to understand precisely that with which the
courts are dealing and how it interacts with the Fourth Amendment.
This Note submits that, rather than adopt a clear approach in
Ganias, thereby ensuring that the law stay apace with recent and
unprecedented technological developments, the Second Circuit
missed a crucial opportunity to recognize what is reasonable when
Because today’s technologies are
searching digital data. 23
revolutionary and, therefore, fundamentally unique, they call for an
entirely new framework and cannot be likened to more traditional
situations with which the courts are more comfortable and familiar.
Physical and digital objects have little, if anything, in common, 24 yet
they are, nonetheless, conflated because technology developers use
the vernacular of known real-world concepts in an attempt to lower

18. 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
19. Id. at 202–03.
20. See Motion to Suppress Evidence, United States v. McCarthy, No. 3:08-cr00224 (EBB) (D. Conn. Oct. 31, 2008), ECF No. 106.
21. See Ganias, 824 F.3d at 212–14.
22. See infra Section II.B.
23. See Ganias, 824 F.3d at 225–26; see also infra Section II.B and Part III.
24. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014) (comparing data
stored on a cell phone to physical items “is like saying a ride on horseback is
materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from
point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together.”).
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the learning curve for the average computer user. 25 This Note
suggests that such skeuomorphic designs and elements are now
leading the law astray, as mimetic details lead many — including the
courts — to focus not on the functioning of the technologies
themselves but, instead, on what is familiar. Consequently, the
Second Circuit’s analysis does a disservice by not promoting the
correct law for the technology actually before it and, instead, leaving
such technology vulnerable to an understanding falsely grounded in
the real-life objects merely mimicked in the digital space.
Given these considerations, this Note concludes that the Second
Circuit should have ruled affirmatively in Ganias that what the
government did was facially reasonable and sufficient to satisfy
Fourth Amendment requirements. 26 Instead, the court decided the
case on good-faith grounds, 27 refraining from developing the law as to
the complex technological questions that were presented.
This Note explores how the courts view digital information for
Fourth Amendment purposes, using Ganias to show how the analysis
can be distorted if electronic storage media are not properly
understood. Part I provides context for the discussion: Section I.A
recounts the facts and procedural history of Stavros Ganias’s case,
which resulted in a rare Second Circuit en banc review of his appeal;
Section I.B provides a general background to relevant Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, examining the text itself, the motivation
for its ratification, how courts have interpreted the warrant and
particularity requirements, and the Amendment’s application to
computer evidence. Part II addresses the shortcomings of a nontechnical analysis of digital data, highlighting the pitfalls of relying on
enticing but false physical analogs. It also critiques the Ganias
opinion for not fully embracing the realities of electronic evidence
and for not defining the boundaries of reasonable computer forensic
examination. Finally, Part III proposes that the issues at play in
Ganias would be abated if courts viewed the authorized seizure as
one of a physical device — a hard drive of data — rather than of the
information itself, drawing several analogies to establish that no
unreasonable government encroachment occurred in Ganias because
warrants were issued by a neutral judge, agents remained within the
scope of those authorities, and no reasonable expectation of privacy
could, therefore, remain.

25. See infra Section II.A.
26. See infra Section III.B.
27. Ganias, 824 F.3d at 225–26.
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I. STAVROS GANIAS, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND COMPUTER
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The progression of the McCarthy and Ganias investigations led to
the emergence of the Fourth Amendment question with which this
Note is concerned. This Part provides the necessary background for
the discussion. Section I.A summarizes the factual and procedural
aspects of the case. Section I.B then turns to the fundamentals of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, with a special focus on digital
searches and seizures.
A. The McCarthy and Ganias Investigations and Prosecutions
Stavros Ganias was an accountant in Connecticut. 28 Among his
clients was James McCarthy, the owner of Industrial Property
Management (“IPM”) and American Boiler, Inc. (“AB”). 29 In
August 2003, government agents learned that IPM may have engaged
in fraud related to an Army contract it had been awarded. 30 As part
of its investigation into that misconduct, in November 2003, the
government applied for and obtained warrants to search both IPM’s
and AB’s offices. 31 In addition, the warrant authorized the search of
Ganias’s business, Taxes International, where IPM’s and AB’s
financial books were maintained. 32 Agents were authorized to seize
“[a]ll books, records, documents, materials, computer hardware and
software and computer associated data relating to the business,
financial and accounting operations of [IPM] and [AB].” 33
Because Ganias was not suspected of any crimes at that time,
agents specially trained in computer forensics elected to create mirror
images 34 of the three computers they discovered rather than
physically remove the hard drives from the office and, thereby,
significantly disrupt Ganias’s business operations. 35 The images
contained all of the data from Ganias’s computers — not just the IPM

28. See id. at 201.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Search Warrant at 4, United States v. McCarthy, No. 3:08-cr-00224 (EBB) (D.
Conn. Oct. 31, 2008), ECF No. 108.
34. A mirror image, also known as a “mirror,” “image,” “clone,” or “bitstream
copy,” is an exact replica of the entirety of the media, down to every bit and byte.
See, e.g., BILL NELSON ET AL., GUIDE TO COMPUTING FORENSICS AND
INVESTIGATIONS: PROCESSING DIGITAL EVIDENCE 37 (5th ed. 2016).
35. Ganias, 824 F.3d at 202 & n.6.
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and AB materials — just as if the agents had seized the physical
computers themselves. 36 Agents subsequently consolidated the
images, archived a copy, and prepared two copies for forensic
analysis, which commenced in June 2004. 37 Over the ensuing months,
agents began to review the materials and identified data that were
responsive to the warrant. 38 Though the agents recovered a number
of files of interest to the investigation, certain materials could not be
accessed and reviewed without specific proprietary software that was
not immediately available to either of the computer specialists
performing the search. 39 However, by December 2004, the agents
were able to access the last of the digital data and reviewed the
relevant IPM and AB files. 40 Based, in part, on the evidence found
on the mirrors, the ongoing investigation into McCarthy, IPM, and
AB culminated in the indictment of McCarthy in 2008. 41
In the course of its McCarthy investigation and independent of
Ganias’s digital data that were seized pursuant to the 2003 warrant,
the government officially expanded its investigation to include Ganias
himself on July 28, 2005. 42 Ganias and his counsel met with the
government in February 2006, at which point the government asked
for consent to search Ganias’s personal and business files contained
on the forensic images. 43 Ganias did not respond to this request, and,
in April 2006, the government sought and obtained — based on an
independent showing of probable cause 44 — a warrant to search the
hard drive images again, this time looking for evidence that Ganias

36. Id. at 202–03. While such a seizure may, at first glance, appear overbroad and
beyond the scope of the warrant, it is necessary for a number of technical reasons.
See discussion infra Section II.A and App. Courts have recognized this necessity in
their interpretation of the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See
discussion infra Section I.B.
37. Ganias, 824 F.3d at 203–04.
38. Id. at 204.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 205.
41. Id. at 205–06.
42. Id. at 206 n.14, 207. Agents noted potential errors in the tax returns Ganias
prepared for McCarthy’s companies; consequently, they subpoenaed five years of his
bank records and reviewed his corresponding personal income tax returns,
concluding that he might be involved in tax evasion by underreporting his own
income just like he had aided McCarthy in underreporting income for McCarthy’s
businesses. One of the case agents testified that, once Ganias was suspected of tax
crimes, the government did not look at any digital evidence pertaining to him or his
business because it was not covered by the seizure authorized in the original warrant.
See id. at 207 n.15.
43. Id. at 207.
44. Id. at 207 n.18.
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had violated certain tax laws. 45 After a search of that data, Ganias
was ultimately indicted for tax evasion in the same 2008 indictment
charging McCarthy. 46 A superseding indictment was filed on
December 21, 2009. 47
Following motions to sever, which the court granted, 48 McCarthy
agreed to plead guilty to a substitute Information 49 and was sentenced
on February 4, 2011, to imprisonment for a year and a day, followed
by a year of supervised release. 50 Ganias proceeded to a jury trial,
which commenced on March 10, 2011. 51 The jury returned a guilty
verdict on April 1, 2011, 52 and, on January 18, 2012, Ganias was
sentenced to two concurrent terms of twenty-four months’
incarceration, plus three years’ supervised release. 53
On the day of his sentencing, Ganias filed a Notice of Appeal from,
among other things, the district court’s ruling on his motion to
suppress. 54 In February 2010, he had moved to suppress the evidence
obtained as a result of the search of his computers pursuant to the two
warrants, alleging that the warrants were overbroad and not
supported by probable cause and that, therefore, the seizure,
retention, and recovered evidence were the fruits of an unreasonable
general warrant. 55 The district court denied the motion 56 and later

45. Id. at 207.
46. See generally Indictment, United States v. McCarthy, No. 3:08-cr-00224
(EBB) (D. Conn. Oct. 31, 2008), ECF No. 1. The first count of the indictment
charges both McCarthy and Ganias with conspiracy to commit tax fraud under 18
U.S.C. § 371. Id. at 2–14. Counts Two and Three pertain specifically to McCarthy. Id.
at 14–15. Counts Four and Five charge Ganias with violating 26 U.S.C. § 7201
(committing tax evasion). Id. at 15–16.
47. See generally Superseding Indictment, McCarthy, No. 3:08-cr-00224 (EBB),
ECF No. 84. This new indictment contained the same five charges but also charged
Ganias with Count Three for his role in the tax evasion related to McCarthy’s
individual 2003 tax return, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting). Id. at 16–
17.
48. See generally Ruling on Defendants’ Motions to Sever, McCarthy, No. 3:08cr-00224 (EBB), ECF No. 133.
49. See Plea Agreement, McCarthy, No. 3:08-cr-00224 (EBB), ECF No. 141.
50. See Judgment as to James L. McCarthy, McCarthy, No. 3:08-cr-00224 (EBB),
ECF No. 171.
51. See Minute Entries, McCarthy, No. 3:08-cr-00224 (EBB), ECF Nos. 182, 188.
52. See Verdict Form, McCarthy, No. 3:08-cr-00224 (EBB), ECF No. 215.
53. See Judgment as to Stavros M. Ganias, McCarthy, No. 3:08-cr-00224 (EBB),
ECF No. 281.
54. See Notice of Appeal, McCarthy, No. 3:08-cr-00224 (EBB), ECF No. 282.
55. See Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note 20.
56. See Order, McCarthy, No. 3:08-cr-00224 (EBB), ECF No. 119.
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issued a written decision. 57 In its decision, the court found that: (1)
the government agents seized the computer data pursuant to a valid
warrant; (2) the valid warrant explicitly set forth a list of items to be
seized, which included computer hardware and software; (3) the
agents used less intrusive means than they were authorized to use by
making mirror images of the hard drives rather than seizing and
holding the computers themselves; (4) the forensic examination of the
computers was conducted within the limitations imposed by the
warrant; (5) the agents viewed only the relevant data that was
extracted as within the scope of the warrant; (6) a copy of the
evidence was preserved in the form in which it was taken; (7) the
defendant never moved for the destruction or return of his data; and
(8) the agents obtained the additional warrant when other leads led
them to expand their investigation, which then authorized them to
search additional data in their possession that they were not
authorized to view under the first warrant. 58
On appeal, the Second Circuit ordered the suppression of the
digital evidence recovered pursuant to the 2006 warrant and vacated
the jury verdict. 59 Although the three-judge panel was unanimous in
its conclusion that the government had violated the Fourth
Amendment, only two judges thought suppression was warranted. 60
The decision emphasized that a search takes place whenever the
government invades persons, houses, papers, or effects or an area
where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 61 Similarly,
property seizure occurs whenever the government interferes in a
meaningful way with a person’s possession of that property. 62
However, following this initial ruling, the full court ordered
rehearing en banc, ultimately reversing the panel and reinstating the
conviction on good-faith grounds. 63 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 64

57. See Ruling on Motion to Suppress Evidence, McCarthy, No. 3:08-cr-00224
(EBB), ECF No. 248.
58. Id. at 19.
59. See United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 141 (2d Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc,
824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016).
60. The case was before Judge Peter Hall, Judge Denny Chin, and Judge Jane
Restani of the Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. Judge Chin
authored the majority opinion, from which Judge Hall concurred in part and
dissented in part.
61. Ganias, 755 F.3d at 133.
62. Id.
63. See United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 225–26 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
The good-faith doctrine provides an exception to the exclusionary rule, allowing for
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The Legal Standards for Digital Searches and Seizures

1.

General Fourth Amendment Principles

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution was
offered and adopted in response to widespread concern about the
English Crown’s use of general warrants, “which often allowed royal
officials to search and seize whatever and whomever they pleased
The
while investigating crimes or affronts to the Crown.” 65
Amendment provides:

the admission of evidence collected by the police in good faith despite a defect in a
search warrant or some other unlawful privacy invasion that would otherwise render
inadmissible the evidence recovered. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922
(1984) (finding that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing
evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated
search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion).
64. Ganias v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 569, 569 (2016).
65. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011); see also MD. CONST. of 1776,
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XXIII, reprinted in AVALON PROJECT, YALE LAW
SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp [https://perma.cc/F4SJE7YD] (finding all general warrants illegal); MASS. CONST., pt. 1, art. XIV,
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/Constitution
[https://perma.cc/KW3P-M4LJ]
(establishing a right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures and finding
that no warrant ought to be issued without the formalities prescribed by law); VA.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. X, reprinted in AVALON PROJECT, YALE LAW
SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/virginia.asp [https://perma.cc/U9SE27F3] (declaring that general warrants are “grievous and oppressive and ought not to
be granted”); Essays of Brutus, No. II, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 372,
375 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“For the security of liberty it has been declared,
that . . . all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or seize
any person, his papers or property, are grievous and oppressive.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Letters from The Federal Farmer, No. VI, in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 256, 262 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“[H]e is subject to no
unreasonable searches or seizures of his person, papers or effects . . . .”); Letters from
The Federal Farmer, No. XVI, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 323, 328
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“[A]ll persons shall have a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . and that all warrants shall be deemed
contrary to this right, if the foundation of them be not previously supported by oath,
and there be not in them a special designation of persons or objects of search, arrest,
or seizure . . . .”); Essays by a Maryland Farmer, No. I, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 9, 14 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“[S]uppose for instance, that an
officer of the United States should force the house, the asylum of a citizen, by virtue
of a general warrant, I would ask, are general warrants illegal by the constitution of
the United States? . . . Suppose a case that must and will frequently happen, for such
happen almost daily in England — That an officer of the customs should break open
the dwelling, and violate the sanctuary of a freeman, in search for smuggled goods —
impost and revenue laws are and from necessity must be in their nature oppressive—
in their execution they may and will become intolerable to a free people . . . .”). See
generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 79–105 (1937).
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 66

As the language itself signals, the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. 67 The Supreme Court has
held that reasonableness generally requires that law enforcement
obtain of a judicial warrant before searching for evidence of
wrongdoing. 68 The warrant requirement ensures that any inferences
supporting the search are drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of by the officer “engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime.” 69 Where law enforcement does not have a
warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within an enumerated
exception to the warrant requirement. 70 However, where the
government is seeking a warrant, “the Warrants Clause requires
particularity and forbids overbreadth.” 71
Thus, to prevent general searches, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing
another. 72 Courts have found that, “[a]lthough somewhat similar in
focus, [particularity and overbreadth] are two distinct legal issues.” 73
A warrant is overbroad when there is no probable cause to support
seizure of certain of the items listed. 74 A warrant is insufficiently
particularized if it does not provide the executing officers with
sufficient guidelines for the search. 75 Thus, breadth requires that the
warrant’s scope be tied to the probable cause on which the warrant is

66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
67. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
68. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
69. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
70. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459–60 (2011).
71. United States v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); accord
United States v. Zemlyansky, 945 F. Supp. 2d 438, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
72. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”).
73. United States v. Levy, No. S5 11 CR 62 (PAC), 2013 WL 664712, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013) (quoting United States v. Hernandez, No. 09 Cr. 625 (HB),
2010 WL 26544, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted),
aff’d, 803 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2015).
74. See id.
75. Id.
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issued, while particularity requires that the warrant clearly state what
is sought. 76
In determining whether a warrant is overbroad, courts must assess
whether there was probable cause to support the scope of the
authorized search. 77 There is sufficient probable cause to justify the
scope of the search “where the totality of circumstances indicates a
‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.’” 78
With regard to particularity, the warrant’s description must be such
that a typical law enforcement officer, with reasonable effort, could
identify the place to be searched. 79 This Fourth Amendment
requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its
justifications and will not become more akin to the wide-ranging
exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit. 80 The warrant
must “describe the items to be seized with as much particularity as the
circumstances reasonably allow” so as to avoid violating the Fourth
Amendment by providing “no assurance that the permitted invasion
of a suspect’s privacy and property are no more than absolutely
necessary.” 81 The particularity requirement avoids such a privacy
invasion and reduces the scope of the search to what a detached and
neutral magistrate has determined is supported by probable cause.82

76. See United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2006); In re A Warrant
for All Content and Other Info. Associated with the Email Account
xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 F. Supp.
3d 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), as amended (Aug. 7, 2014) [hereinafter In re Google
Warrant].
77. See United States v. Zemlyansky, 945 F. Supp. 2d 438, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
78. Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
79. See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925); see also United States v.
Williams, 69 F. App’x 494, 495–96 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We have previously stated the
general rule regarding particularity: [i]t is enough if the description is such that the
officer[s] armed with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and
identify the place intended.” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 1994) (supporting the
same proposition); United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he
warrant must enable the executing officer to ascertain and identify with reasonable
certainty those items that the magistrate has authorized him to seize.”); United States
v. Vargas, 621 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[Defendant] argues that the search warrant
issued by the Magistrate was insufficiently precise . . . . We agree with the court below
that the description was sufficiently specific to permit the rational exercise of
judgment in selecting what items to seize. The warrant did not authorize such a
broad ‘roving commission’ as to be constitutionally offensive.” (citation omitted)).
80. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
81. George, 975 F.2d at 75–76.
82. See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84.
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To be sufficiently particular, a warrant must contain “sufficiently
particularized language that creates a nexus between the suspected
crime and the items to be seized.” 83 Without something clearly
limiting the officers’ discretion during the warrant’s execution, it is
meaningless to have the safeguard of a judge who reviews and
approves the scope of the search in the first place. 84 For this reason,
authorization to search for “‘evidence of a crime,’ that is to say, any
crime, is so broad as to constitute a general warrant.” 85 A mere
reference to “evidence” of a violation of a general criminal statute —
or just criminal activity broadly — provides no obvious guidelines for
the executing officers as to what to seize. 86
At the same time, however, generic terms may be used in
describing the materials to be seized, as the Fourth Amendment does
not require that each individual item or document be specifically
The level of specificity that is
identified in the warrant. 87
constitutionally required depends on a number of factors, including
“the nature of the crime, and ‘[w]here . . . complex financial crimes
are alleged, a warrant properly provides more flexibility to the
searching agents.’” 88 To satisfy the particularity requirement, then,

83. Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1010 (10th Cir. 2010).
84. See George, 975 F.2d at 76; see also Mink, 613 F.3d at 1011 (explaining that a
warrant for “all computer and non-computer equipment and written
materials . . . without any mention of any particular crime” is unconstitutionally
broad); United States v. Fleet Mgmt. Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(holding that a warrant for “any and all data” is an unconstitutionally broad general
warrant); United States v. Clough, 246 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87–88 (D. Me. 2003) (finding
that a warrant authorizing seizure of all text and images on the computer is
unconstitutionally broad because there are “no restrictions on the search, no
references to statutes, and no references to crimes or illegality”); United States v.
Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 584 (D. Vt. 1998) (finding that a warrant for “all
computers . . . all computer storage devices . . . and all computer software systems”
that did not indicate “the specific crimes for which the equipment was sought” was
unconstitutionally broad (alteration in original)).
85. George, 975 F.2d at 76 (emphasis in original).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (wire
fraud); United States v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1509 (9th Cir. 1989) (fraud); United
States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 176–77 (1st Cir. 1987) (stolen goods); Voss v.
Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 1985) (conspiracy); United States v.
Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1982) (tax evasion).
87. See United States v. Levy, No. S511-cr-62 (PAC), 2013 WL 664712, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013), aff’d, 803 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2015).
88. Id. (quoting United States v. Dupree, 781 F. Supp. 2d 115, 149 (E.D.N.Y.
2011)); see United States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp. 3d 59, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing
Dupree for the same proposition); see also United States v. Cohan, 628 F. Supp. 2d
355, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he degree to which a warrant must state its terms with
particularity varies inversely with the complexity of the criminal activity
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the warrant has to be sufficiently specific to inform the executing
officers’ rational exercise of judgment in selecting which items to
seize. 89
In exercising that judgment, “[a]mple case authority sanctions
‘some perusal, generally fairly brief, of . . . documents (seized during
an otherwise valid search) . . . in order for the police to perceive the
relevance of the documents to crime.’” 90 This standard is driven by
the practicalities confronting the individuals executing the search, as
“allowing some latitude in this regard simply recognizes the reality
that few people keep documents of their criminal transactions in a
folder marked ‘drug records.’” 91 Law enforcement must be able to
exercise control over the documents as a threshold matter to
determine whether they fall within the scope of the warrant. 92

2.

Searching Electronic Evidence

Regarding electronic evidence, courts have recognized that a
search for responsive records cannot be completed on-site because of
the enormous volume of undifferentiated information and
documents, and they have thus “developed a more flexible approach
to the execution of search warrants for electronic evidence, holding
the government to a standard of reasonableness.” 93 Ordinarily, the

investigated.” (quoting United States v. Regan, 706 F. Supp. 1102, 1113 (S.D.N.Y.
1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
89. See United States v. Liu, 239 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Mink, 613
F.3d at 1010 (finding that a warrant must state with specificity what is to be taken so
that “nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant”).
90. United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 115 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting United
States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1257 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979)); accord Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (“In searches for papers, it is certain that some
innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine
whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.”); United
States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 577 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he police may look
through . . . file cabinets, files and similar items and briefly peruse their contents to
determine whether they are among the documentary items to be seized.”); United
States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The incriminating character
limitation necessarily permits a brief perusal of documents in plain view in order to
determine whether probable cause exists for their seizure under the warrant.”).
91. United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990); see also United States
v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 974 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that a warrant authorizing the
seizure of records of criminal activity “permits officers to examine many papers in a
suspect’s possession to determine if they are within the described category”).
92. See In re Google Warrant, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 391–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), as
amended (Aug. 7, 2014).
93. United States v. Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d 205, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); accord
United States v. Graziano, 558 F. Supp. 2d 304, 317 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that
courts have afforded law enforcement “leeway in searching computers for
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particularity and overbreadth requirements restrict the government’s
ability to seize all of someone’s papers or effects for off-site
examination — as items not described in the warrant are being seized,
which is akin to the effects of a forbidden general, exploratory
warrant. 94 However, in certain situations, the materials are so
intermingled that they reasonably preclude sorting at the time of
execution. 95 For instance, in response to challenges by defendants,
many courts have upheld outright seizure or copying of entire hard
drives — or other devices — to effectuate a proper search for
whatever has been expressly specified in the warrant. 96 In United

incriminating evidence within the scope of materials specified in the warrant”);
United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 578 (D.N.J. 2001) (“Where proof of
wrongdoing depends upon documents . . . whose precise nature cannot be known in
advance, law enforcement officers must be afforded the leeway to wade through a
potential morass of information in the target location to find the particular evidence
which is properly specified in the warrant.”).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 72–86.
95. Forensic analysis of electronic data could take many months depending on the
size of the storage medium and the number of devices recovered. As such, it is
simply not viable for the police to occupy a person’s home or office for that length of
time while determining what to seize and what to leave behind. Instead, authorities
routinely create a mirror image of a hard drive, which is then searched over time in a
controlled setting. See discussion infra Section II.A and App.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding
that the need to search for digital data that was not limited to a known file or set of
files, as well as the inability to know how many files there were or where they might
have been stored, justified the seizure and subsequent off-site search of the whole
computer system); United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 652 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The
federal courts are in agreement that a warrant authorizing the seizure of a
defendant’s home computer equipment and digital media for a subsequent off-site
electronic search is not unreasonable or overbroad, as long as the probable-cause
showing in the warrant application and affidavit demonstrate a sufficient chance of
finding some needles in the computer haystack.” (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)); United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 234 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting
requirement of “on-site” search of hard drives because the practical realities of
computer investigations preclude them); United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 782
(7th Cir. 2010) (“Undoubtedly the warrant’s description serves as a limitation on
what files may reasonably be searched. The problem with applying this principle to
computer searches lies in the fact that such images could be nearly anywhere on the
computers. Unlike a physical object that can be immediately identified as responsive
to the warrant or not, computer files may be manipulated to hide their true
contents.”); United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1269 (10th Cir. 2006)
(upholding seizure and subsequent off-site search of computer in a “laboratory
setting”); United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding seizure
and search of an entire computer system because officers had no way of knowing
where the illicit images were stored); United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st
Cir. 1999) (“As a practical matter, the seizure and subsequent off-premises search of
the computer and all available disks was about the narrowest definable search and
seizure reasonably likely to obtain the images [of child pornography]. A sufficient
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States v. Bowen, the court found the “all records exception” to

the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement allowed for the
seizure of the entirety of the defendants’ email accounts and held that
the Amendment did not require the warrant to specify search terms
or methodologies in advance. 97 The court also found that there is no
requirement that the executing authorities delegate a pre-screening
function to the Internet service provider or ascertain which e-mails
are relevant before copies are obtained from the Internet service
provider for subsequent searching. 98 Other courts have agreed. 99

chance of finding some needles in the computer haystack was established by the
probable-cause showing in the warrant application . . . .”).
97. United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675, 681–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d
sub nom. United States v. Ingram, 490 F. App’x 363 (2d Cir. 2012).
98. Id. at 682.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 2002) (upholding
as constitutionally reasonable the seizure of “all of the information” from defendant’s
email account where the service provider did not “selectively choose or review the
contents of the named account”); In re Search of Info. Associated with
[redacted]@mac.com That is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F.
Supp. 3d 157, 165 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[B]ecause the government’s proposed procedures
comply with the Fourth Amendment and are authorized by Rule 41, there is no need
for Apple to search through e-mails and electronic records related to the target
account and determine which e-mails are responsive to the search warrant . . . . [I]t
would be unworkable and impractical to order Apple to cull the e-mails and related
records in order to find evidence that is relevant to the government’s investigation.”);
United States v. Ayache, No. 3:13-CR-153, 2014 WL 923340, at *2–3 (M.D. Tenn.
Mar. 10, 2014) (denying motion to suppress “seizure of all emails in a defendant’s
account, where there was probable cause to believe that the email account contained
evidence of a crime”); United States v. Deppish, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1219–21, 1219
n.37 (D. Kan. 2014) (noting that “nothing in § 2703 precludes the Government from
requesting the full content of a specified email account, nor has the Tenth Circuit
ever required warrants to identify a particularized search strategy” and concluding
that such a search is not a “general search”); United States v. Lebovits, No. 11-CR134 (SJ), 2012 WL 10181099, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 11-CR-134 (SJ), 2014 WL 201495 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16,
2014), and report and recommendation adopted sub nom. United States v. Gutwein,
No. 11-CR-134 (SJ), 2014 WL 201500 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014) (“It is difficult to
imagine how, as a practical matter, the government could have searched the
defendants’ email accounts more narrowly. Clearly, the service providers could not
be expected to review and parse the emails on the government’s behalf . . . .”);
United States v. Taylor, 764 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236–37 (D. Me. 2011) (finding a warrant
to search emails and seize evidence related to defendant’s income and financial
means “reasonably limits the evidence to be seized” and was not overly broad simply
because the government was authorized to search all information associated with his
email account); United States v. McDarrah, No. 05 CR 1182 (PAC), 2006 WL
1997638, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006) (denying a motion to suppress the seizure
of “[a]ll stored electronic mail and other stored content information” in the
defendant’s email account (alteration in original)), aff’d, 351 F. App’x 558 (2d Cir.
2009). But cf. United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1166–67 (10th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement may or may not
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The Bowen court reasoned that “[t]o limit the government’s
computer search methodology ex ante would ‘give criminals the
ability to evade law enforcement scrutiny simply by utilizing coded
terms in their files or documents’ or other creative data concealment
techniques.” 100 Rather, the Supreme Court has held that the
executing agents have discretion to determine how best to proceed
with a search authorized by warrant. 101 The Court observed that
“[n]othing in the language of the Constitution or in this Court’s
decisions interpreting that language suggests that . . . search warrants
also must include a specification of the precise manner in which they
are to be executed.” 102
The 2009 amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
added Rule 41(e)(2)(B) to reflect the case law, providing that:
A warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of
electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically
stored information. Unless otherwise specified, the warrant

authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with
the warrant. The time for executing the warrant in Rule 41(e)(2)(A)

and (f)(1)(A) refers to the seizure or on-site copying of the media or
information, and not to any later off-site copying or review. 103

The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2009 amendments explain
that electronic storage devices contain such large quantities of data
that it would be impractical for executing officers to review all of the
information at the search location. 104 The Committee clarified that
require limitations ex ante, but “even if courts do not specify particular search
protocol up front in the warrant application process, they retain the flexibility to
assess the reasonableness of the search protocols the government actually employed
in its search after the fact, when the case comes to court, and in light of the totality of
the circumstances.”); United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“Moreover, in contrast to our discussion of the overbroad seizure claim above, there
is no case law holding that an officer must justify the lack of a search protocol in
order to support issuance of the warrant. As we have noted, we look favorably upon
the inclusion of a search protocol; but its absence is not fatal.”).
100. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (quoting United States v. Graziano, 558 F.
Supp. 2d 304, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)); see also United States v. Karrer, 460 F. App’x
157, 162 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[G]iven the nature of computer files and the tendency of
criminal offenders to mislabel, hide, and attempt to delete evidence of their crimes, it
would be impossible to identify ex ante the precise files, file types, programs and
devices that would house the suspected evidence.”); Stabile, 633 F.3d at 237
(“[C]riminals can—and often do—hide, mislabel, or manipulate files to conceal
criminal activity, [so] a broad, expansive search of the hard drive may be required.”).
101. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979).
102. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98 (2006) (quoting Dalia, 441 U.S. at
257).
103. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
104. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s note (2009).
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the rule “acknowledges the need for a two-step process: officers may
seize or copy the entire storage medium and review it later to
determine what electronically stored information falls within the
scope of the warrant.” 105 Courts have since consistently upheld this
two-step procedure as explicitly authorized by the Rule. 106 As one
district judge explained, “the seizure or ‘off-site imaging’ (that is,
copying) of computer hard drives is ‘a necessity of the digital era.’” 107
Finally, there are similar impracticalities for including limitations
on the timing of a search of electronic information, which would
“The Fourth
unduly restrict legitimate search objectives. 108

105. Id.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Kanodia, No. 15-10131-NMG, 2016 WL 3166370, at
*7 (D. Mass. June 6, 2016) (explaining that, “[i]n overseeing the warrant process, the
Court is ‘primarily concerned with identifying what may be searched or seized—not
how’ and generally will not interfere with the discretion of law enforcement in
determining ‘how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by
warrant’” (quoting United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 1999) and
United States v. Tsarnaev, 53 F. Supp. 3d 450, 464 (D. Mass. 2014))); Enjaian v.
Schlissel, No. 14-CV-13297, 2015 WL 3408805, at *9 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2015) (“In
the Federal context, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B) and its
associated commentary specifically contemplates an extended search due to the
existence of encryption.”); United States v. Garcia-Alvarez, No. 14-cr-0621 JM, 2015
WL 777411, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2015) (“Rule 41 thus provides that electronic
storage devices must be seized or copied at the site of seizure (‘on-site’) within the 14
days allowed for execution of the warrant, and may be copied and reviewed later at
another location (‘off-site’), so long as the later copying and review are consistent
with the warrant.”); United States v. Shah, No. 5:13-cr-328-FL, 2015 WL 72118, at *17
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2015) (“The two-step procedure which the government employed
here is expressly authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B).”);
United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14-cr-68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039, at *14 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 10, 2014) (“[I]t is important not to confuse the separate concepts of the seizure
of an item—which were quite specifically identified but which were seized in their
entirety—with the search itself. The search is plainly related to the specific evidence
sought.”); United States v. Fernandez, No. 12-835 (JLL), 2014 WL 1418295, at *21–22
(D.N.J. Apr. 11, 2014) (“Defendant’s argument that ‘the government failed to follow
the protocols set forth in the warrant for the seizure of electronic information, which
mandated that a search of the materials be conducted by [a set date]’ is
unavailing . . . . The agents’ actions here complied with the Federal Rules and were
neither unconstitutional nor illegal.”); United States v. Roberts, No. 3:08-CR-175,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123188, at *43 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 21, 2009) (“[T]he Court notes
that Rule 41 has now been amended to reflect the distinction between the time the
computer data is seized and the time that it is analyzed . . . .”).
107. See In re Google Warrant, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), as
amended (Aug. 7, 2014) (quoting United States v. Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d 205, 214
(E.D.N.Y. 2012)).
108. See id. at 400; see also United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1097 (10th Cir.
2009) (“Probable cause to search was unaffected by the delay and the reasons to
search the computer and hard drives did not dissipate during the month and a half
the items sat in an evidence locker.”).
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Amendment does not specify that search warrants contain expiration
dates.” 109
As the foregoing discussion suggests, there is no established upper
limit as to when the government must review seized electronic data to
determine whether the evidence seized falls within the scope of a
warrant. 110 What the Fourth Amendment requires is that the
government complete its review within a reasonable period of time. 111
A number of cases have held that a delay of several months between
the seizure and the completion of the government’s review of
electronic evidence is reasonable. 112 The Advisory Committee Notes
indicate that “[a] substantial amount of time can be involved in the
forensic imaging and review of information. This is due to the sheer
size of the storage capacity of media, difficulties created by
encryption and booby traps, and the workload of the computer
labs.” 113

109. United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 955 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United
States v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 1556, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993)); see also United States v.
Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487 (1985) (finding that, while police officers may not
indefinitely retain possession of a vehicle and its contents before they complete a
valid warrantless search, the owner of the property must show that delay in the
completion of a search was unreasonable because it adversely affected a privacy or
possessory interest).
110. See Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 215; see also United States v. Hernandez, 183 F.
Supp. 2d 468, 480 (D.P.R. 2002) (“Neither Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 nor the Fourth
Amendment provides for a specific time limit in which a computer may undergo a
government forensic examination after it has been seized pursuant to a search
warrant . . . . The same principle applies when a search warrant is performed for
documents. The documents are seized within the time frame established in the
warrant but examination of these documents may take a longer time, and extensions
or additional warrants are not required. The examination of these items at a later
date does not make the evidence suppressible.”).
111. See Metter, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
112. Id. (citing United States v. Mutschelknaus, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1076–77
(D.N.D. 2008), aff’d, 592 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding a two-month delay
reasonable) and United States v. Burns, No. 07 cr 556, 2008 WL 4542990, at *8–9
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2008) (finding a ten-month delay for completion of the
government’s review reasonable)); see also United States v. Alston, No. 15 Cr. 435
(CM), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63776, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2016) (finding a threemonth delay for the search of the defendant’s iPhone to be in compliance with Rule
41).
113. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s note (2009). The Committee added
that, “[w]hile consideration was given to a presumptive national or uniform time
period within which any subsequent off-site copying or review of the media or
electronically stored information would take place, the practical reality is that there is
no basis for a ‘one size fits all’ presumptive period.” Id.; see also discussion infra
Section II.A.
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Accordingly, so long as a warrant (1) specifies with particularity
what evidence the government intends to seize, 114 (2) establishes
probable cause that the evidence is connected to a specific criminal
statute, 115 and (3) includes sufficient limitations to prevent a potential
general search, 116 it meets the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. 117 For digital data, creating a mirror image of a hard
drive specified in a warrant for later off-site review is constitutionally
permissible in most instances — even where wholesale removal of
tangible papers would not be — because of the great burdens on-site
review would place on the parties. 118 Nevertheless, off-site review of
the mirror images is still subject to the rule of reasonableness, as the
general reasonableness standard that governs all Fourth Amendment
analysis also controls the actual method of a warrant’s execution. 119
II. THE “DIGITAL MISUNDERSTANDING” AND THE IMPRACTICALITY
OF GANIAS

Because of the way in which the average person conceives of
computer data, this Note suggests that it is all too easy for the courts
to impose false conceptions of what is reasonable when assessing the
government’s seizure and retention of a digital storage device. The
Ganias case raises the question whether the government can keep and
later use information that is acquired through the execution of a valid
warrant but is beyond the scope of the initial seizure. Because
responsive and non-responsive digital data are necessarily comingled,
however, the government must copy or seize the entire disc, thereby
seizing a great deal of non-responsive data in the process. 120 Yet, the

114. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also supra text accompanying notes 79–89.
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 72–78.
117. See In re Search of Info. Associated with Email Addresses Stored at Premises
Controlled by the Microsoft Co., 212 F. Supp. 3d 1023, 1037 (D. Kan. 2016).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 93–96, 103–07.
119. See United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (“The general touchstone
of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis . . . governs the
method of execution of the warrant.” (citation omitted)).
120. At least one commentator argues that the language of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41 suggests that copying information may not be a seizure at all.
See Mark Taticchi, Note, Redefining Possessory Interests: Perfect Copies of
Information as Fourth Amendment Seizures, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 476, 488–90
(2010) (arguing that Rule 41(e)(2)(A) twice refers to seizure or copying and that
Rule 41(f) also refers to seizures and copies as distinct alternatives). Traditionally, a
seizure occurs “when there is ‘some meaningful interference with an individual’s
possessory interests in that property.’” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 419
(2012) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); see also United
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entire hard drive has been seized pursuant to a particularized warrant
authorizing its seizure, and it is not unreasonable for a judge to later
authorize further inquiry beyond the initial strictures of the original
warrant. In determining the reasonableness of the seizure and later
use, courts erroneously rely on an implicit assumption that digital
data are akin to physical files. However, this Note argues that,
because modern technological innovations operate fundamentally
differently, they need to be treated as such by the courts, with devices
— not data — subject to Fourth Amendment balancing.
A. Digital Data Only Seem Like Physical Files but Are, in Fact,
Distinct
The search of a digital device is different from traditional searches
of physical locations or objects in many respects. First, the ordinary
police officer typically is not trained in digital forensics, which is the
application of scientific methods and techniques to the search and
retrieval of data from a computer hard drive or other storage
medium. 121 Whereas officers routinely execute warrants and conduct

States v. Miller, 799 F.3d 1097, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Lavan v. City of Los Angeles,
693 F.3d 1022, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2012). Some cases have held that photocopying
documents or taking photographs of materials does not constitute a “seizure”
because the government’s actions do not meaningfully interfere with the owners’
possessory interest. See, e.g., United States v. Mancari, 463 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir.
2006) (photographs); Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 707 (6th Cir. 1992)
(photographs); United States v. Thomas, 613 F.2d 787, 793–94 (10th Cir. 1980)
(photocopies). At least three district courts have held that accessing or copying
electronic data is not a “seizure” because such transfers do not interfere with the
owner’s access to or possessory interest in the data. See In re Search Warrant No. 16960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 719–21 (E.D. Pa. 2017); In re Application
of the United States for a Search Warrant for Contents of Elec. Mail and for an
Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Servs. to not Disclose the Existence of
the Search Warrant, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1222 (D. Or. 2009); United States v.
Gorshkov, No. CR00-550C, 2001 WL 1024026, at *8 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001).
This author disagrees: even though the right to exclude must — and does — yield to
the needs of law enforcement, the Fourth Amendment would be meaningless if law
enforcement could just copy any electronic information with no constraints. But
those constraints must be reasonable under the circumstances, taking into account
the realities of the digital world. See infra Section II.A and App.
121. See, e.g., NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 2 (“The definition of digital
forensics has also evolved over the years from simply involving securing and
analyzing digital information stored on a computer for use as evidence in civil,
criminal, or administrative cases. The former director of the Defense Computer
Forensics Laboratory . . . defined it as ‘[t]he application of computer science and
investigative procedures for legal purpose involving the analysis of digital evidence
(information of probative value that is stored or transmitted in binary form) after
proper search authority, chain of custody, validation with mathematics (hash
function), use of validated tools, repeatability, reporting and possible expert
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physical searches, computer forensics analysis is typically performed
pursuant to a search warrant by a trained analyst at a certified
computer forensics laboratory. 122 Examiners employ specialized and
standardized techniques and procedures when conducting their search
to protect the integrity of the source evidence — the original
computer or device that was seized — and to detect erased, protected,
or otherwise obfuscated information. 123
Given how hard drives work, 124 the ideal starting point for any
forensic examination of digital data is the creation of a bit-by-bit copy
of the source media, 125 which is then validated as an exact replica
through a mathematical process known as “hashing.” 126 A forensic
image differs from the ordinary copying or backing up of files, as a
validated acquisition tool actually creates a single “file” that contains
all the data on the source disk. 127 Every bit of data from the hard
drive is duplicated on a separate medium. 128 This process ensures
that all of the data on the original hard drive is copied, not just stillexisting and visible files. 129 For example, when a user deletes or

presentation.” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)); JOHN SAMMONS,
THE BASICS OF DIGITAL FORENSICS 2 (2d ed. 2015).
122. See COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE
IN
CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS
71
(2009),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H9QE-QB2Y] (“In most cases investigators will simply seize the
hardware during the search, and then search through the defendant’s computer for
the contraband files back at a computer forensics laboratory.”).
123. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 5 (“Like an archaeologist excavating a
site, digital forensics examiners retrieve information from a computer or its
components. The information retrieved might already be on the drive, but it might
not be easy to find or decipher.”).
124. See infra App.
125. See, e.g., NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 38 (“The first rule of digital
forensics is to preserve the original evidence. Then conduct your analysis only on a
copy of the data—the image of the original medium.”); SAMMONS, supra note 121, at
7 (“Examining the original media is something that should be absolutely avoided if at
all possible. The danger is that the original evidence could very well be modified in
some way or even destroyed outright. Preferably, a forensic image is made and all
examinations are made on this duplicate, rather than the original.”).
126. See SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 8. Hashing is the process by which a oneway algorithm is run across a given dataset, producing a unique value that serves as
that data’s “digital fingerprint” and that is used to compare two files or pieces of
media to prove that they are mathematically identical. Id. at 61–62.
127. NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 38.
128. SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 54.
129. NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 38; see also SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 54
(“Why not just copy and paste the files? The reasons are significant. First, copying
and pasting only gets the active data—that is, data that are accessible to the user . . . .
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overwrites files on a hard drive, the disk actually still contains those
deleted files and file fragments of partially overwritten files. 130 When
a file is deleted by the user, the space it occupies is merely designated
as free space, allowing it to be used for new or other files.131
However, the original files remain on the disk until something else is
written to the same physical location on the hard drive disk, thereby
overwriting the original file.132 Until that happens, the original files
can still be retrieved, even though, from the user’s perspective, those
files are no longer on the computer. 133 All of this data is captured in a
forensic image. 134
Imaging and hashing are extremely important steps in the forensic
process, as pressing just a single key on a running computer effects
changes to its data 135 and contaminates — and potentially destroys —
relevant evidence. 136 The image is created in such a way that no
changes are written to the original drive 137 and it is, thus, possible to
say with certainty that the mirror matches its source in all respects,
including the “empty” space. 138 Therefore, part of the standard

Second, it does not get the data in the unallocated space, including deleted and
partially overwritten files. Third, it doesn’t capture the file system data. All of this
would result in an ineffective and incomplete forensic exam.” (emphasis in original)).
130. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 41.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 54.
135. Id. at 58 (“Interacting with a running computer, in any way, causes changes to
the system. Any change to a piece of evidence is bad and can cause major problems
from a legal standpoint. These alterations can call the integrity of the evidence into
question. Even when a machine is just sitting there and powered on, things are
changing. When a person interacts with a running machine, even more things are
changing . . . . [T]hese changes may have no impact on the artifacts relevant to the
case. But the system is changing nonetheless.”).
136. Id. at 55 (“[D]igital evidence is extremely volatile. Thus, you never want to
conduct your examination on the original evidence unless there are exigent
circumstances or there is no other option available.”); id. at 57 (“Any writes to the
evidence will compromise its integrity and jeopardize its admissibility. Getting a
functioning write-blocking device or software in place will keep this from
happening.”).
137. Id. at 56 (“It’s critical to have some type of write blocking in place before
starting the process. A write block is a crucial piece of hardware or software that is
used to safeguard the original evidence during the cloning process . . . . The write
block prevents any data from being written to the original evidence drive. Using this
kind of device eliminates the possibility of inadvertently compromising the
evidence.” (emphasis in original)); see also NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 269.
138. See SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 61–62 (“A hash is a unique value generated
by a cryptographic hashing algorithm. Hash values (functions) are used in a variety
of ways, including cryptography and evidence integrity. A hash value is commonly
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computer forensics procedure is to hash the source drive, image the
drive, hash the image, and rehash the source drive to validate that the
process resulted in an exact replica and that no changes were made to
the original evidence. 139 Every bit of the drives — each 1 or 0 — is
configured in the exact same way, making them truly identical
copies. 140
Once a duplicate has been made, forensic examiners can then use
their skills, experience, tools, and knowledge of the particular
investigation to attempt to locate significant artifacts on the subject
media. 141 In the course of using a computer, even a savvy user will
leave breadcrumbs of his activity scattered throughout the device, and
this evidence can be uncovered and preserved by a forensic examiner
who knows where to look. 142 This evidence is not cabined to the
active files and data that the average person — or judge —
contemplates when thinking about what is stored on a computer.143 It

referred to as a ‘digital fingerprint’ or ‘digital DNA.’ Any change to the hard drive,
even by a single bit, will result in a radically different hash value. Therefore, any
tampering or manipulation of the evidence is readily detectable . . . . A hash value is
sent along with the image so it can be compared with the original. This comparison
verifies that the image is a bit-for-bit copy of the original.”). Borrowing from and
adapting Professor Sammons’ example of how the slightest change will produce
divergent
hashes,
compare
the
SHA1
hashes
for
“NYC”
(02c0d1c277fbc2dd4ec90a77cea5740739c2663b)
and
“N.Y.C.”
(e1e92b5f282cde1233750126d1adc73bff2d304a).
139. Id. at 62. The leading forensic software, AccessData’s Forensic Toolkit, or
FTK, and Guidance Software’s EnCase, will automatically produce hashes at each
step and for each drive as part of its built-in imaging functionality. See generally
CHRIS JENSEN, ACCESSDATA, FTK USER GUIDE (2016); GUIDANCE SOFTWARE,
ENCASE FORENSIC IMAGER USER’S GUIDE (2013).
140. See SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 62. Often, a second copy is made, allowing
the first copy to be archived in the same state in which it was “found” while the
second copy is examined for relevant information. Yet, by retaining the “starting
point” of the analysis, one can safely “start over” if something goes wrong, id. at 56, is
able to replicate the results to verify accuracy, id. at 62, and has preserved a
“snapshot” of the data for evidentiary purposes, id. It is crucial to capture and
preserve the data as it was found on the target system. In the physical world, flipping
through a book seized from someone’s home will not change the contents of the
book, and no one would expect an investigator to write on the original evidence or
tear out a relevant page in order to return other irrelevant portions. The book would
be preserved as it was found, because the integrity of the evidence is the driving
consideration. However, if, after seizing the book, the officer makes a photocopy of
important pages, then the investigator could manipulate and analyze those copies as
needed because the original book is retained as the authentic source of the evidence.
Chain of custody, as well as laying an evidentiary foundation, are both implicated.
141. Id. at 8.
142. Id. at 65–66.
143. For instance, contrary to what many people believe, deleting files does not
actually do anything to the data itself—it only signals that the space occupied by
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is, therefore, imperative that a forensic examination not be limited to
a predetermined area and that a full image of a disk serve as the
starting point, with the trained analyst looking at the whole collection
of bits and bytes to determine what is relevant to the case at hand.
Professor Orin Kerr, a leading computer crime and Fourth
Amendment scholar, aptly describes how computer searches “are
more of an art than a science.” 144 The search is an iterative process,
with the forensic examiner beginning his search with simple
techniques and then continuing down a different route or escalating
his methods and tools based on what he uncovers. 145 The search itself
informs the process, and the investigators respond appropriately.146
For this reason, as discussed above, both case law and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize seizure without ex ante
limitations and permit subsequent searching subject to ex post review
for reasonableness 147 — leaving it to the discretion of the analyst
conducting the search to determine how and where to find relevant
evidence within the scope of the warrant. 148 It is crucial to keep in

those files is available if and when the computer needs it. See supra notes 130–33,
257–62 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the role of the “Recycle Bin” and
its forensic implications, see SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 73–74.
144. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV.
531, 547 (2005).
145. Id. at 575 (“[T]he computer forensics process is contingent, fact-bound, and
quite unpredictable. Before an analyst starts searching a storage device, he normally
has little idea which operating system the computer is running, what software is on it,
how that software was used, what else is on the hard drive, or whether the suspect
took steps to hide, misname, or otherwise disguise files. Perhaps the defendant made
no effort to hide incriminating files; perhaps he changed file extensions, altered file
headers, encrypted files, or took other steps to thwart the forensics process. Nor will
investigators necessarily know what forensic tool the analyst may use when
performing his search. Different forensic tools have different features; tasks that may
be easy using one program may be hard using another.”).
146. Id. (“It is difficult to know what the particular search requires and what tools
are best suited to find the evidence without first taking a look at the files on the hard
drive. In a sense, the forensics process is a bit like surgery: the doctor may not know
how best to proceed until he opens up the patient and takes a look. The ability to
target information described in a warrant is highly contingent on a number of factors
that are difficult or even impossible to predict ex ante.”).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 93–119.
148. See Kerr, supra note 144, at 545–46 (“[G]ood forensic analysis is an art more
than a science. To find a specific type of file believed to be stored in a particular
location or generated by a particular program, an analyst might begin by looking first
at that location or program. He might run a search through known files for a
particular word or phrase associated with the file or information sought. After
conducting a logical search, the next step might be to try a physical search for that
same string of text. The physical search would look not just in particular files, but
more broadly throughout the entire hard drive.”).
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mind, however, that the analyst is not merely sorting discrete files into
“relevant” or “irrelevant” categories, as the average computer user
may when organizing his electronic data or as an officer does when
The examiner is
conducting a traditional physical search. 149
conducting a forensic search, and the whole hard drive, as one seized
entity, is the subject of the review and can shed light on the case. 150
B.

The Shortcomings of the Ganias Opinions

Given the serious and complex considerations that pertain to
digital searches, this Note argues that the Second Circuit should have
reached the Fourth Amendment question and found that the
government’s actions were facially reasonable and constitutionally
sufficient. In November 2003, the government sought and obtained a
warrant for a distinct investigation based on particularized facts.151
Based on the investigation and various pieces of collected evidence,
the government responded to its increased knowledge, adapting and
reacting to what the facts revealed. As such, Ganias was officially
named a subject of the investigation in July 2005 — which he had not
been when the investigation commenced and when his hard drives
were imaged. 152 The investigation continued to unfold organically,
but when, after several months, Ganias did not respond to the
government’s request that he consent to its search, the agents
obtained a second judicially authorized search warrant at the end of
April 2006. 153 This natural progression, with court involvement along
the way, should hardly be described as an unreasonable search and
seizure; rather, the government diligently worked to uncover criminal
activity and to build a successful prosecution — ultimately with great
success.

149. See infra App.; see also Kerr, supra note 144, at 544 (“In contrast to physical
searches, digital evidence searches generally occur at both a ‘logical’ or ‘virtual’ level
and a ‘physical’ level. The distinction between physical searches and logical searches
is fundamental in computer forensics: while a logical search is based on the file
systems found on the hard drive as presented by the operating system, a physical
search identifies and recovers data across the entire physical drive without regard to
the file system.”).
150. See infra App.; see also Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the
Fourth Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 127 (2011) (“Another problem
with the file strategy is its underlying assumption that only files contain evidence.
That assumption is a gross simplification. Forensic examiners examine media, not
just files.”).
151. See United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
152. See supra note 42.
153. See Ganias, 824 F.3d at 207.

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

189

Had the government decided to include Ganias as a target of the
investigation the day after the original seizure of his data, would the
“retention” (for a day) and re-search of the materials pursuant to a
new warrant be considered unreasonable? Conversely, had the
government never focused on Ganias but, two-and-a-half years later,
found a new piece of relevant evidence as to McCarthy on the hard
drives, would it be unacceptable for the government to continue
exploiting what it lawfully possessed to strengthen its initial
investigation? It would be hard to object to these hypotheticals, so it
is unclear why, when looking through evidence for Investigation One
and finding a lead for Investigation Two, the government should not
be allowed to expand the scope of its initial search through a new
warrant, allowing it to pursue both investigations. Moreover, the
McCarthy prosecution was still pending, so it was not unreasonable to
retain the seized hard drive so it could serve as relevant evidence.
Therefore, if the government reasonably possesses a lawfully seized
hard drive, why should it not be able to obtain an additional warrant
from the court, expanding the boundaries of the search?
Additionally, here, Ganias moved to suppress the evidence while
he was being prosecuted. 154 It was this motion that led to the appeal
and rehearing en banc. But, had he never become the subject of an
investigation, the retention of the data for the investigation and
prosecution of McCarthy would not have been challenged as
unreasonable. While there is an underlying concern about general
warrants, questions about the propriety of the search and seizure only
arose because irrelevant information suddenly became relevant when
the investigation was broadened to include an additional subject.
Even then, the agents proceeded as they should, obtaining a
particularized warrant at each step of their investigation.
Not only are Ganias’s arguments unfounded, but the solution he
demanded is not viable.
Ganias argued that considerations
underlying the prohibition on general warrants may require that,
when the government lawfully images an entire hard drive —
containing both responsive and non-responsive information — for
off-site review, it may not retain the mirror throughout the pendency
of the investigation. 155 However, there is no other forensically sound
manner by which to preserve digital evidence in an investigation. 156
The responsive and non-responsive data are inextricably linked

154. See Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note 20.
155. See id.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 124–50.
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because of how they reside on the storage medium. 157 Some cannot
be taken while leaving the rest behind, 158 and, at the early stages of an
investigation, what can be found — or a clear distinction between
what is relevant or irrelevant — may not even be known. 159
Therefore, it would be foolish to, in effect, corrupt the evidence160
when the full range of potential evidence has not yet been
identified, 161 as the process of hastily plucking a single obviously
pertinent file could result in overwriting less obvious data that is
harder to retrieve but that would be highly probative if uncovered.
The interwoven whole must be taken in its entirety, 162 with the data
therein carefully parsed — pursuant to the scope of the warrant — for
use as evidence.
The Advisory Committee’s comment to the 2009 amendments to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B) recognizes the need
for a two-step process — seizing/copying the entire storage medium
and later reviewing it to determine what electronically stored
information falls within the scope of the warrant — because
computers and other electronic storage media commonly contain such
large amounts of information that it is impractical, if not impossible,
for law enforcement to review all of the information during the
execution of the warrant. 163 Thus, apart from the effects of the ways
in which the individual bits of datum interact, the whole should be
seized because attempts to parse the information before seizure
would be unworkable and inefficient in light of the sheer volume of
information. 164 This explains why the warrant itself authorized the

157. See infra App.
158. Id.
159. See Kerr, supra note 144, at 575; see also Goldfoot, supra note 150, at 140–41
(“Searching for electronic evidence is like looking for needles in a haystack. If an
officer looks for a needle in a haystack, he must look at a lot of hay. Worse, if he
doesn’t know how many needles there are, but must find all of them, then he must
look through all the hay.”).
160. See SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 55, 57, 58; see also infra App.
161. See Kerr, supra note 144, at 575.
162. See Goldfoot, supra note 150.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 103–13.
164. Id. As noted above, courts have applied and generally accepted this same
two-step process for email search warrants for the same reason. See supra text
accompanying notes 97–100. In these instances, the warrant acts as a twofold
instrument: an order requiring the provider to turn over data in its possession and an
order permitting a government agency to review those materials. See 18 U.S.C. §
2703(a), (d) (2018). Given that the provider has no knowledge of the investigation
and what is relevant or not, it merely turns over the entirety of the content it has; the
government then reviews and finds what it needs in that mass of data. See, e.g., In re
Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com That is Stored at Premises
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seizure of the hard drive, not just specific files that might be found on
it. 165
To support his motion to suppress the evidence, Ganias relied on
United States v. Tamura, a Ninth Circuit case in which physical
records were seized and later sorted into responsive and nonresponsive items. 166 There, it was clear that papers outside the scope
of the warrant were seized and retained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 167 However, while not actually making a determination
because of its good-faith resolution, the Ganias court noted in dictum
that Tamura is different because, in Ganias, the 2003 warrant
specifically authorized the agents to seize hard drives and to search
them off-site — a key difference that distinguishes Ganias because
the agents did not come into possession of anything unlawfully. 168 In
Tamura, the initial seizure was not warranted 169; the officers seized
for off-site review records that the warrant did not authorize them to
seize and retained those records even after their return was
requested. 170 In contrast, in Ganias the question was whether, at

Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 157, 165 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[I]t would be
unworkable and impractical to order Apple to cull the e-mails and related records in
order to find evidence that is relevant to the government’s investigation.”); United
States v. Lebovits, No. 11-cr-134 (SJ), 2012 WL 10181099, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30,
2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 11-cr-134 (SJ), 2014 WL 201495
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014), and report and recommendation adopted sub nom. United
States v. Gutwein, No. 11-cr-134 (SJ), 2014 WL 201500 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014)
(“Clearly, the service providers could not be expected to review and parse the emails
on the government’s behalf.”). The extent of the provider’s role is that it can say
what was requested of it, whether it had records matching that request, and that, if so,
it turned those materials over to the government. The provider can only speak to the
overall production it passes along. Another witness would need to articulate what is
relevant and verify that it was found within the data he or she was provided—
something the provider would have no way of knowing. The same is true for the
mirror files created when imaging a device; the process does not involve copying all
of the individual files (as an average computer user may) but actually involves
creating one massive file that stands alone and that is then handed off for individual
threads to be pulled from the larger weave.
165. See Search Warrant, supra note 33, at 3–5. Having seized a coherent piece of
evidence, it is clear that its retention for use as evidence is reasonable. See infra Part
III.
166. United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1982).
167. Id. at 596 (“In the absence of an exercise of [a neutral, detached magistrate’s]
judgment prior to the seizure . . . it appears to us that the seizure, even though
convenient under the circumstances, was unreasonable.”).
168. See United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 211 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
169. See Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595 (“It is highly doubtful whether the wholesale
seizure by the Government of documents not mentioned in the warrant comported
with the requirements of the fourth amendment.”).
170. Id. at 595–97.
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some point, the retention of what was lawfully seized suddenly
became unreasonable, especially when its return was never
requested. 171 In Ganias, there is no question that the government was
entitled to seize the materials it did; the issue was whether it had the
right to retain that data and subsequently re-search it.
In addition, Tamura is inapposite because that case involved paper
records and, therefore, did not account for the complexities of
modern technology; such analogies that seem to apply on the surface
are not appropriate at all. 172 There is a strong temptation to adopt
familiar stand-ins for complex technological issues, but that
superficial appeal must be overcome. 173 The court, however, failed to
“decide the relevance, if any, of Tamura” and instead resolved the
case on good-faith grounds. 174
The court stated that it must be attuned to “the technological
features unique to digital media as a whole and to those relevant in
the particular case.” 175 Why, then, did it not rule on what is
reasonable and squarely address the novel technological features
themselves? The opinion argued that it raised the privacy question,
the aptness and limitations of Ganias’s analogies, and the
government’s concerns to highlight the intricacy of the questions for
future cases and to underscore the importance of engaging with the
technological specifics in answering such questions. 176 But, if so, why
wait and not just resolve it now? The opinion justified its approach,
writing, “Caution, although not always satisfying, is sometimes the
most appropriate approach.” 177 Here, however, caution offers no
consensus or guidance and will only result in more confusion. In New
York v. Belton, the Supreme Court had articulated that “[a] single,
familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only
limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they
confront.” 178 Similarly, as Judge Calabresi previously noted in his

171. See Ganias, 824 F.3d at 203 n.7, 207, 211.
172. See supra Section II.A and infra App.
173. See supra Section II.A and infra App.
174. Ganias, 824 F.3d at 211.
175. Id. at 213.
176. Id. at 217.
177. Id. at 221 n.42.
178. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981); see also United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 22 n.3 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“A highly
sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the
drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff
upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be
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concurrence in United States v. Cancelmo, courts of appeal typically
have the final word in the vast majority of cases in which good faith
supplants the need for a probable cause finding. 179 He explained:
This means that we owe a duty to define the boundaries of probable
cause, so that affiants submitting applications for warrants, issuing
magistrates, reviewing courts, and the executing officers on whose
good faith we rely may have appropriate guidance. And these
boundaries are best set, not by abstract statements, but by case-bycase decisions in real situations. 180

Yet, by making a finding of good faith and not reaching the merits
of the Fourth Amendment question in Ganias, the Second Circuit has
only further complicated an already complex space. The court has
not clarified the constitutionality of these technical searches. This
silence raises a number of difficult questions. If the same facts play
out today in an entirely separate case, would the investigating agents
be entitled to rely on a warrant in good faith? If no court has
answered the question, should we expect the agents to do so? Should
a reviewing magistrate think twice before issuing a warrant for data
that have already been in the government’s possession for some time?
Does it matter whether the new evidence relates to the same case or
defendant for which the original warrant was issued? The court
explained that no court had held that the retention of a mirrored hard
drive during the pendency of an investigation would violate the
Fourth Amendment. 181 Yet, that statement still holds true today, as
the court failed to resolve the issue one way or the other.
As the court suggested, perhaps a statutory provision could serve
as a guide. 182 Under this rubric, a determination of whether retention
is still necessary would be made by the trial court on a motion from
the person whose property has been seized, according to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41(g). 183 Yet, the Second Circuit declined to

literally impossible of application by the officer in the field.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
179. See United States v. Cancelmo, 64 F.3d 804, 809 (2d Cir. 1995).
180. Id.
181. See Ganias, 824 F.3d at 225.
182. See id. at 220 (“In acknowledging the role of Rule 41(g), then, we seek also to
suggest that search and seizure of electronic media may . . . merit not only judicial
review but also legislative analysis; courts need not act alone.”).
183. The rule provides: “A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of
property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return. The
motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized. The court must
receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the
motion, the court must return the property to the movant, but may impose
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rule on the factors that should be considered and offered no clear
pathway for the lower courts that will have to grapple with motions
regarding property retention and return. The court noted that,
because it resolved this case on other grounds, it “need not address
whether Ganias’ failure to make such a motion forfeited any Fourth
Amendment objection he might otherwise have had to the
Government’s retention of the mirrors.” 184 With some guidance, the
trial courts, perhaps, would be best suited to determine whether the
seized materials were still needed for the many reasons discussed
above. The court, however, provided little direction to those courts
because it did not rule on the ultimate question — whether the
retention of forensic copies of hard drives during the pendency of an
investigation violates the Fourth Amendment.
As discussed, 185 the Advisory Committee noted that Rule
41(e)(2)(B) does not create a presumptive uniform time period within
which off-site review must take place, 186 so the court should be
afforded deferential review of its findings as to the reasonable
circumstances of the retention. This approach would safeguard
privacy interests — through a motion to the trial court — while also
addressing the needs of law enforcement given the challenges posed
by technological changes. 187 If the court denies the motion and, in
essence, re-authorizes the government to possess what it lawfully
seized, then subsequent law enforcement activity, such as obtaining
and executing a new warrant for newly identified relevant portions of
the data, would also be lawful. However, because the Second Circuit,
after electing to rehear the matter en banc, articulated no
precedential guidance as to the retention question, it lends no
assistance to future courts facing similar issues — only fueling legal
complications pertaining to computers and digital data. None of the

reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and its use in later
proceedings.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g).
184. Ganias, 824 F.3d at 219.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 103–13.
186. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee’s note (2009).
187. Id. (“It was not the intent of the amendment to leave the property owner
without an expectation of the timing for return of the property, excluding contraband
or instrumentalities of crime, or a remedy. Current Rule 41(g) already provides a
process for the ‘person aggrieved’ to seek an order from the court for a return of the
property, including storage media or electronically stored information, under
reasonable circumstances. Where the ‘person aggrieved’ requires access to the
storage media or the electronically stored information earlier than anticipated by law
enforcement or ordered by the court, the court on a case by case basis can fashion an

appropriate remedy, taking into account the time needed to image and search the
data and any prejudice to the aggrieved party.” (emphasis added)).
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issues raised by Ganias has been answered, yet those issues are sure
to resurface again and again.
Unlike the majority, the dissent did reach the issue and at least put
forth clear — albeit mistaken — law. The en banc opinion overrode
the bright-line pronouncement of the original panel opinion, which,
though flawed, was not replaced with anything more suitable. The
dissent suggested that “[the government] argues that when computers
are involved, it is free to overseize files for its convenience, including
files outside the scope of a warrant, and retain them until it has found
a reason for their use.” 188 However, as discussed, the government’s
actions were not undertaken for convenience but out of necessity.189
If it were merely concerned about convenience, the government could
have saved itself the effort of imaging onsite and would have simply
seized all of the original hard drives as the warrant authorized it to
do, 190 inconveniencing Ganias but vastly expediting its fieldwork.
The government was not asking for greater latitude, as the dissent
claimed, 191 but rather was treating a totally different scenario as
necessitating a new framework, as the seizure and search of
electronically stored information does not lend itself to the strictures
suggested.
With respect to authenticating the data at trial, the dissent
minimized the implications of losing an unchangeable baseline
snapshot, writing that, “[a]s a practical matter, a claim of data
tampering would easily fall flat where, as here, the owner kept his
original computer and the Government gave him a copy of the mirror
image.” 192 But this fails to recognize that, without being able to point
to the original source location on the bit-for-bit copy, it would just be
the witness’ word that specific digital evidence came from where he
says it did. Even though the defendant retained the original and the
government analyzed an image, the forensic examiner would still
explain (and provide documentation regarding) from where the
relevant digital evidence came — the precise benefit of an exact bitfor-bit copy. The exactness of identical duplicates can be clearly
shown. 193
However, were select files extracted and no original source
retained, there would be no way to go back and verify the findings in
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Ganias, 824 F.3d at 226 (Chin, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 124–50.
See Search Warrant, supra note 33, at 3–5.
See Ganias, 824 F.3d at 226 (Chin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 235.
For a discussion of hashing, see SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 8, 61–62.
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advance of or during testimony about digital evidence. All of the
findings in a forensic report point back to the precise locations on the
original drive where the items discovered were located. So, by having
a forensic report and the original image, anyone can use the report as
a roadmap to recheck the forensic examination and validate or
discredit the findings and testimony. If there is no source, however, it
comes down to the witness’ testimony alone, constricting the
defense’s ability to attack the specifics but also leaving the
government’s case vulnerable to distortion that cannot be rebuffed.
For example, retention is necessary because the government may
need to respond to defenses raised about the data on crossexamination. This could involve reexamining something already
looked at, searching for something not yet uncovered, or even trying
to prove that something, in fact, did not happen. To prove a negative,
the examiner would need to be able to look at the entirety of the
drive and confirm that the absent thing is not located anywhere
whatsoever on the drive. 194 Defense counsel could also make claims

194. A frequent defense is that a virus affected the defendant’s computer and
surreptitiously downloaded the incriminating evidence (such as images of child
pornography or stolen personal identifying information). In some instances, the
government examiner might go back and look at the drive image and conclude that
there was no virus located anywhere on the hard drive. Similarly, the examiner may
go back and search for viruses (which might not have been relevant originally and,
therefore, not discussed in his findings) and, finding some, opine on the validity of the
defendant’s claim. See, e.g., United States v. O’Keefe, 461 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir.
2006) (“[The government’s expert] testified that the two viruses he found on [the
defendant’s] computer were not capable of ‘downloading and uploading child
pornography and sending out advertisements.’”); see also Goldfoot, supra note 150,
at 141 (“Sometimes the crucial evidence is ‘the dog that did not bark[]’ . . . —the
absence of evidence that would be present if something happened, thus suggesting it
did not happen. If a defendant claims he is innocent because a computer virus
committed the crime, the absence of a virus on his hard drive is ‘dog that did not
bark’ negative evidence that disproves his story. If a defendant claimed he sent an email but it cannot be found on his hard drive, that absence is also ‘dog that did not
bark’ negative evidence. To prove something is not on a hard drive, it is necessary to
look at every place on the drive where it might be found and confirm it is not
there.”). In fact, Ganias himself made such a claim. See Ganias, 824 F.3d at 207 n.16
(“According to Agent Hosney, in that proffer session Ganias claimed ‘that he failed
to record income from his own business [to his QuickBook files] as a result of a
computer flaw in the QuickBooks software . . . [but that,] . . . although he attempted
to duplicate the software error, he was unable to do so.’ Agent Hosney contacted
Intuit, Inc., which released QuickBooks, to determine whether such an error might
have affected, generally, the pertinent version of the software, and was told that the
company was aware of no such ‘widespread malfunction.’” (alterations in original)
(citations omitted)); id. at 214 n.31 (“Data confirming the existence, or non-existence,
of an error affecting the particular installation of a program on a given digital storage
device could be, in a hypothetical case, relevant to the probity of information
otherwise located thereupon.”).
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of tampering, so the government needs to have the ability to go to the
full image, verify that it has not changed from its original state, and
demonstrate the source of the relevant data it is using. By retaining
the original source evidence, a full chain of custody can be established
and the evidence can be definitively authenticated. 195
Finally, retention of the full copy of a hard drive is necessary to
safeguard the defense’s ability to present its case. The government
must be able to provide the defendant with a copy of what it plans to
use against him. 196 As discussed, digital information is volatile, so
even if the defendant retained the original device the whole time —
as was the case in Ganias — the information would not be the same
the moment the device is next used, even if the relevant data were
still present at the time of trial 197 — which was not the case in Ganias.
If a defendant is going to hire his own forensic specialist to attempt to
rebut the allegations being leveled against him, that person needs to
be able to conduct his examination from the same starting point as
the government, with the same file remnants and residue interspersed
in and among the visible files. 198 The defense may also be interested
in looking for exculpatory evidence or other information on the drive
that the government did not view as significant, making it unfair for
the defendant if he only gets to see what the government has chosen
to extract as relevant to its case. 199 Here, as before, the dissent
dismissed the need to retain a copy for evidentiary purposes, saying
that “[t]he Government is essentially arguing that it must hold on to

195. Investigators will routinely testify that they seized a digital device from a
specific location and provided it to a specific person or unit. Then the forensic
examiner will testify that he or she obtained the device from the investigator or an
evidence locker and, after imaging it, conducted various examinations of that data.
Seizure details, hash values, and other pertinent information are all logged and
reported. If the original evidence is not retained in full, then there is a missing piece
in the chain when presenting the case to a jury, which defendants would undoubtedly
use to their advantage.
196. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 135–40. For instance, if the government
searched a computer, found and seized a relevant spreadsheet for use as evidence of
the charged crime, but then gave back the computer, even if the spreadsheet were
still present at the time of trial, the metadata and other associated information would
have changed.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Kimoto, 588 F.3d 464, 480 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing
how defense experts argued “that the discovery provided to the defense did not
appear to be a complete forensic copy, and that such was necessary to verify the data
as accurate and unaltered”).
199. Unlike the dissent, the majority recognizes that such considerations are
relevant and not trivial. See Ganias, 824 F.3d at 215 n.35.
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the materials so that it can give them back to the defendant.”200
However, as discussed, this is a drastic oversimplification of the
factors at play, and the government’s concerns are not obviated
“simply by returning the non-responsive files to the defendant in the
first place.” 201 The dissent’s reasoning exemplifies the temptation of
the “digital misunderstanding,” reaching the wrong outcome because
of how the issues were framed.
III. GANIAS SIMPLIFIED IF VIEWED FROM A DIFFERENT
PERSPECTIVE
It is important to understand: data on a hard drive is actually one
thing — a magnetic platter containing interwoven information that,
taken together, comprises the documents, images, and software with
which users regularly interact. 202 Ordinarily, data from multiple
locations come together to form what the user sees as a single file; but
it is the whole drive, both the active data and the latent information in
previously-used or empty space, that can inform an investigation and
that is the actual evidence. 203 Therefore, a hard drive must be
understood as and treated like a single entity, protected as such to
make sure that no accidental changes are made, which could
overwrite relevant information. 204 By design, hard disks themselves
are fragmented, with information rarely stored in one place in case of
hardware failure. 205 In fact, a single file can be stored across entirely
separate hard drives. 206 Thus, unlike physical files in a folder,

200. Id. at 235 (Chin, J., dissenting).
201. Id.
202. See infra App.
203. See supra Section II.A.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 135–40.
205. Hard drives can be divided into partitions, which specify how much of the
hard drive a given file system can occupy. The hard drive itself will start with a
Master Boot Record, which has a partition table identifying how the drive has been
divided and identifying the starting and ending sectors of each partition. Partitions
can also be divided into smaller virtual partitions, and a computer can have multiple
hard drives. Thus, the device can be configured in a number of ways, and each
partition can be formatted with any file system (for example, a single hard drive can
contain one partition running Windows and another partition running Linux or Mac
OS). See EOGHAN CASEY, DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME 450–52 (3d ed.
2011).
206. For example, with a RAID, or a “redundant array of independent disks,”
multiple physical hard drives are configured to act as a single logical drive. In other
words, the data is spread across a number of disks to improve both redundancy and
performance. However, the entire array appears to the operating as a single logical
See
RAID,
OXFORD
DICTIONARIES,
hard
disk.
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/raid
[https://perma.cc/2RZE-HPYJ]
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computer data cannot be neatly segregated into responsive and nonresponsive data upon first review. Forensic examinations of digital
data are iterative processes, and it may take several passes and
varying levels of tools and techniques to extract just some of the
wealth of relevant information that may be hidden in the haystack of
a single hard drive. 207
Thus, because of features that simply do not exist in the context of
paper files, it is important to try to avoid the trap of speciously
analogizing rather than viewing digital issues in their own right. The
government’s search or seizure of digital media cannot be constrained
by the limitations historically imposed on physical searches, as the
realities of modern technologies are wholly different and should not
be governed by procedures that significantly and unduly cabin the
government’s legitimate enforcement efforts. Whenever digital data
are searched, a neutral judge will have issued a warrant for a
particular hard drive based on specific probable cause, which should
obviate concerns about haphazard governmental rummaging and
widespread, invasive general searches.
As such, when the
government obtains a digital device pursuant to a warrant, it is
inherently reasonable that it retain the whole drive through, at a
minimum, the pendency of the investigation and prosecution —
especially when it can be demonstrated that fruitful evidence has
been found therein.
A. Better, but Less Obvious, Analogies that Support the Authority
To Retain and Search
Josh Goldfoot, Deputy Chief of the Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property Section of the Department of Justice,
persuasively argues that, although search and seizure law is the
product of a number of authorities over different periods of time,
with few exceptions, the authors all assume “an external, physical

(“Redundant array of independent (or inexpensive) disks, a system for providing
greater capacity, faster access, and security against data corruption by spreading data
across several disk drives.”).
207. See Kerr, supra note 144, at 544 (“Computer searches tend to require fewer
people but more time. According to Mark Pollitt, former Director of the FBI’s
Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory Program, analysis of a computer hard drive
takes as much time as the analyst has to give it. If the case is unusually important or
the nature of the evidence sought dictates that a great deal or a specific type of
evidence is needed, the analyst may spend several weeks or even months analyzing a
single hard drive. If the case is less important or the nature of the case permits the
government to make its case more easily, the investigator may spend only a few
hours.”).
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perspective.” 208 As such, search and seizure rules apply to physical
objects. With technology, attempts to subdivide and differentiate
between the abstract data and their tangible representations on some
storage medium is, therefore, misplaced. 209 Digital evidence is
ultimately just a physical manifestation of abstract information that
cannot actually exist apart from its physical reduction. Thus, a
physical thing — the storage medium itself — is seized, not the
information thereon. Were the government to seize a single piece of
paper with both responsive and non-responsive information on it, it
would be unreasonable to expect the government to tear off the nonresponsive parts and hand them back. By recognizing a seized drive
of digital data as a cohesive entity, the treatment of digital evidence is
much clearer, and the seizure of such evidence is regulated by a
reasonableness inquiry that is closer to that used for other physical
evidence. 210 Seen in this light, the complexity of the Ganias issue
diminishes and the correct result becomes apparent: having lawfully
seized the hard drive and still requiring it for the investigation, it is
perfectly reasonable for the government to seek and obtain judicial
authorization to also use the hard drive for another purpose. As long
as authorities are in lawful possession of the evidence as part of an
ongoing investigation or prosecution, they should be permitted to
pursue any lawful avenues for further investigation of the same or an
otherwise-related matter.
The reasonableness of this approach will be demonstrated by way
of three analogies that are more apropos than the tempting and often
invoked “filing cabinet” comparison, which does not account for the
realities of the technology — making the analogy a poor fit. 211 While
no analogies are perfect because of the uniqueness of the
technological questions before the courts, a lot can be gained by not
looking to subdivide the seized evidence fictitiously. What is seized is
a hard drive of digital data; it should be preserved, maintained, and
evaluated just like most other types of physical evidence that could be
recovered.

208. Goldfoot, supra note 150, at 122.
209. See, e.g., People v. Aleynikov, 48 N.Y.S.3d 9, 15–17 (App. Div. 2017) (finding
that the electronic transmittal of stolen proprietary source code constituted a tangible
reproduction since it necessarily took up physical space and was physically present on
a physical hard drive), aff’d, 104 N.E.3d 687 (N.Y. 2018).
210. See Goldfoot, supra note 150, at 149.
211. The Ganias court recognizes the potential imperfection of the filing cabinet
analogy and vaguely references possible alternatives; however, the opinion fails to
address them thoroughly or to adopt the implications of those better comparisons as
a holding. See United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
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Seizure of a Car

There are a number of reasons why the police may seize a person’s
car. For instance, if a vehicle is used in or to facilitate the commission
of a crime, it can be seized as an instrumentality of the crime.212 A
car may also be seized because it threatens safety or presents traffic
hazards. 213 Often when such a seizure occurs, the police are
authorized to conduct a search without a warrant. 214 For the sake of
this argument, however, suppose that the police seize an automobile
pursuant to a warrant because they have sufficient probable cause to
believe that it was involved in a fatal hit-and-run accident. The police
execute the warrant, recover the car, and bring it to an evidence
garage for examination and safekeeping. Suppose they swab the
bumper to look for evidence of the victim’s DNA and, when the tests
come back, they confirm that the police found exactly what they
thought they did: direct evidence of the defendant’s wrongdoing.
Would the retention of the evidence for the pendency of the

212. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (affirming the search of
petitioner’s impounded vehicle and subsequent seizure of evidence as reasonable
because it was closely tied to the reason petitioner was arrested, the reason his car
was impounded, and the reason why it was retained—transporting narcotics); Van
Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 469 (1926) (affirming forfeiture of defendant’s vehicle
due to its use in the illegal transportation of liquor).
213. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375–76 (1976) (finding an
inventory search of a car that was impounded for minor parking violations to be
reasonable given the police’s caretaking function); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 441 (1973) (“Local police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate
vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what,
for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions,
totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating
to the violation of a criminal statute.”); Breath v. Cronvich, 729 F.2d 1006, 1008 (5th
Cir. 1984) (finding a statute that permitted police to impound illegally parked
vehicles constitutional); Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir.
1982) (holding that pre-seizure notice and a hearing are not required when the
impounded vehicle is illegally parked but not blocking traffic or otherwise creating an
emergency); Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 76 A.3d 44, 47–48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)
(finding impoundment of the vehicle after a crash lawful and the subsequent search
reasonable as an inventory search); State v. Bales, 552 P.2d 688, 689 (Wash. Ct. App.
1976) (“Reasonable cause for impoundment may, for example, include the necessity
for removing (1) an unattended-to car illegally parked or otherwise illegally
obstructing traffic; (2) an unattended-to car from the scene of an accident . . . (3) a
car that has been stolen or used in the commission of a crime when its retention as
evidence is necessary; (4) an abandoned car; (5) a car so mechanically defective as to
be a menace to others using the public highway . . . .”).
214. The body of law pertaining to vehicle searches and seizures is vast and
complex in and of itself. Rather than address all the nuances and factors at play in
that area, this argument will assume that warrants were necessary for and obtained
prior to the hypothetical searches.
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investigation and potential trial be reasonable? Would anyone expect
the government to return, say, the seats, radio, and seatbelts because
they are not relevant to the case and, therefore, should be considered
unlawfully over-seized and beyond the scope of the warrant?
To take the comparison one step further, suppose the police
independently realize that the car they have seized appears to be one
in which they have been interested for a separate investigation into a
gang-related shooting. It is the big break in an investigation that had
stalled. Now the police prepare a new affidavit laying out the
probable cause for their need to search the car for a new type of
evidence. A judge reviews the facts and authorizes the warrant. In
the course of their new search, the police find a hidden trap215
containing several illegal firearms — direct evidence incriminating
their second suspect. Should this evidence, only found because the
police happened to have made the seizure in the course of their initial
investigation, be suppressed? There is an aspect of bad luck for the
second defendant, but does that mean that the government’s actions
violated the Fourth Amendment? Particularized warrants were
executed, and fruitful results were recovered from appropriately
limited searches. 216 The mere fact of retention should not render the
process unreasonable.
Finally, now imagine that either of the defendants — the hit-andrun driver or the gang shooter — raises some claim or defense at trial.
Might the government need to go back and perform additional
searches or analyses? Maybe the defense challenges the integrity of
the forensic swab, so the test needs to be recreated or confirmed.
Perhaps, to bolster its case, the government now wants to pull data
from the car’s computer system to show the vehicle’s speed at the
time of the accident or that the breaks were never applied. All of this
requires that the car, as evidence, was preserved and handled
carefully to ensure it remained unchanged and uncompromised. It is
also foreseeable that, in some situations, the car itself might be
introduced as evidence or that some form of demonstration might be

215. A “trap” is a colloquial term for a hidden compartment built into a vehicle,
which can be quite sophisticated and may require a specific procedure to open. See
Brendan Koerner, Alfred Anaya Put Secret Compartments in Cars. So the DEA Put
WIRED
(Mar.
19,
2013,
6:30
AM),
Him
in
Prison,
https://www.wired.com/2013/03/alfred-anaya/ [https://perma.cc/QQ26-F8ET].
216. For the sake of this argument, assume that the police did not or were not
authorized to search the entire car upon seizure, through either an accepted warrant
exception or as an inventory search. However, thinking about how these accepted
searches — beyond the scope of the original probable cause — might translate to a
digital search is an interesting exercise that could be explored further.
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given to the jury. Perhaps the government wants to show the jury the
intricate process required to open the trap, such as setting the
temperature to a specific setting while applying the break and
lowering the passenger window. All of these considerations weigh in
favor of retention, suggesting that it is reasonable and that the
physical evidence seized need not — and should not — be subdivided.

2.

Evidence Found in a Couch Cushion

Now suppose that law enforcement has been investigating a
narcotics operation and believes it has identified the location where
the drugs were being produced and distributed. The police prepare
an affidavit and obtain a warrant based on the articulated probable
cause. They search the suspected location and recover a couch
cushion that is stuffed with bags of marijuana and that contains traces
of a white powder that might be cocaine. The police seize this
cushion and plan to conduct testing on the substance with the hope of
introducing it as evidence at trial.
Now suppose that, some months later, the defendant’s neighbor
contacts the lead investigator and tells him that the defendant had
raped her in his apartment. Because some time had passed,
investigators cannot find any physical evidence to corroborate the
victim’s claims, so the case is essentially the victim’s word against the
defendant’s, who claims that the victim has never been inside his
apartment and that they have never had any type of sexual encounter.
However, because the victim has several prior arrests, the prosecutor
is concerned that the jury might not find her credible, meaning the
case would not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Nonetheless,
the prosecutor thinks there might be enough probable cause to obtain
a warrant to examine the alleged crime scene. When officers execute
the warrant, they find that the apartment has been entirely cleared
out since the first warrant had been executed. Investigators then
remember, however, that the couch cushion is still being held as
evidence for the drug case. They get a warrant from a judge to swab
the cushion, and subsequently find that it contains a mix of the
defendant’s and the victim’s DNA — completely rebutting the
defendant’s story and greatly enhancing the victim’s credibility. Were
the retention, searches, and separate convictions unreasonable and
violative of the Fourth Amendment? Should the government have
somehow attempted to separate the substance from the cushion itself
so the latter could be returned? Or is the evidence inextricably linked
with the medium, thereby necessitating retention of what is arguably
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not relevant for the sake of preserving the integrity of the forensic
evidence?

3.

A Bloody Sweatshirt

Consider a third hypothetical. The police are investigating a
violent altercation, after which one of the participants succumbed to
his injuries. They recover the victim’s bloody sweatshirt, which, in
addition to the victim’s own blood, is suspected of containing blood or
other trace evidence belonging to the other assailant. Forensic
analysis identifies the perpetrator, and that individual is prosecuted
for assault and homicide. Based on their interviews with the victim’s
associates — and entirely separate from any forensic analysis of the
sweatshirt — authorities eventually suspect the victim was part of a
domestic terrorism group. The police get a warrant to reexamine the
sweatshirt, 217 this time looking to test it for any traces of explosives.
The results come back positive for bomb-making materials, providing
the probable cause for another warrant for the victim’s residence.
That search reveals a trove of damning evidence that also implicates
the victim’s roommate. Should the sweatshirt evidence, and its fruits,
not be admissible for both the prosecution against the assailant and
against the roommate? Does it matter that there would not have
been probable cause for the apartment search, which led to the
roommate’s prosecution, had the government not retained the
sweatshirt and later used it for a purpose other than the one for which
authorities originally possessed it? Should the police have cut out the
relevant bloodstain so that the rest of the sweatshirt could be
returned to the victim’s family? Would even the blood itself contain
too much non-responsive information beyond the relevant details
authorities needed? 218

217. For excellent examples of how the government is regularly permitted to
reexamine, without a new warrant, what has been lawfully seized, see Goldfoot, supra
note 150, at 152 (citing cases involving clothing, cars, carpet fibers, purses, paper,
videotapes, and even the defendant’s hands). However, to fit the Ganias fact pattern,
this analogy will assume that a warrant was obtained even though one might not be
necessary.
218. In his article, Josh Goldfoot rightly suggests that the seizure of blood itself is
an appropriate comparison to how digital evidence should be treated, as would be an
examination of someone’s clothing. See id. at 150 (“Blood is a good example of how
courts treat physical evidence as objects, rather than containers of information. Like
computer storage media, blood contains intermingled information, some irrelevant to
an investigation. Examining a man’s blood forensically can reveal whose blood it
was, what he had been eating, what drugs or medicines he took, and, perhaps,
whether he is sick. Yet, once officers lawfully seize blood, they may examine it
without obtaining a warrant.”); id. (“Every object has the potential to disclose facts
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No Fourth Amendment Rights Were Actually Violated in

Ganias

Despite the complexities raised by Ganias, no Fourth Amendment
rights were actually violated. In making its finding of good faith, the
court found that the agents had acted reasonably. 219 Under both the
case law and the subsequently enacted Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(e)(2)(B), imaging and later off-site review is permitted
and is subject to review for reasonableness. 220 If the court found the
agents acted reasonably and, thus, used the good-faith exception to
avoid suppression of the evidence — assuming, arguendo, that a
Fourth Amendment violation occurred — why is the agents’ very
same conduct not reasonable under a Fourth Amendment balancing?
The court’s same analysis should justify the retention and subsequent
search. The agents sought and obtained a warrant for a distinct
investigation using particularized facts — not once, but twice. In the
course of its investigation, the government acted upon increased
knowledge and new facts — as expected and desired in a search for
the truth. Investigations regularly take twists or unexpected turns,
and a search warrant or wiretap order can be supplemented or
amended. 221 Here, warrants were obtained prior to each search based

about people who owned it, kept it, touched it, used it, moved it, or were just near it.
Suppose a store clerk reports that the man who robbed her wore blue jeans stained
with battery acid, and police obtain a warrant that allows them to seize a single thing:
the blue jeans. That one item reveals information that is irrelevant to the
investigation, and is also perhaps quite private. Forget the possibility that anything is
in the pockets. The blue jeans tell us the man’s waist size and let us guess if he is
overweight or not. The brand tells us that he shops at Wal-Mart. Grease near the
cuffs suggests he has ridden a bicycle. The smell suggests he has been around tobacco
smoke. A worn right pocket suggests he favors that hand.”).
219. See United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 225 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(“Finally, the record here is clear that the agents acted reasonably throughout the
investigation. They sought authorization in 2003 to seize the hard drives and search
them off-site; they minimized the disruption to Ganias’s business by taking full
forensic mirrors; they searched the mirrors only to the extent authorized by, first, the
2003 warrant, and then the warrant issued in 2006; they were never alerted that
Ganias sought the return of the mirrors; and they alerted the magistrate judge to
these pertinent facts in applying for the second warrant. In short, the agents acted
reasonably in relying on the 2006 warrant to search for evidence of Ganias’s tax
evasion.”).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 103–19.
221. See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Having
found the rental agreement [for a storage locker during a lawful search of the
defendant’s home], the agents did not proceed lawlessly to search the locker; they
presented their evidence to a magistrate who justifiably found probable cause to
believe that a search of the locker would uncover evidence of drug trafficking.”);
United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 781–83 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that nothing

206

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

on probable cause independent from the results of the search.222
Where independent probable cause supports a new warrant, agents
should be allowed to look where they could not before. If the agents’
conduct was so reasonable that suppression was not warranted, how
could that very same reasonable conduct not satisfy the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment?
Warrants protect privacy through the Fourth Amendment
requirement that they issue only “upon probable cause.” 223 This
ensures that searches are conducted in a manner that minimizes
needless intrusions on privacy.
Here, two separate judicial
authorizations found the invasion to be warranted. Law enforcement,
in doing its job, is going to impose on people’s privacy — rummaging
through homes, 224 cars, 225 bags, 226 safe deposit boxes, 227 or even a
person’s body. 228 Warrants, or the application of one of the

requires the issuing judge to announce formally in open court that he noticed the
interception of evidence not covered by the original order and that it is enough if
notification of the interception of evidence not authorized by the original order is
clearly provided in the renewal/amendment application papers); United States v.
Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 526–28 (E.D. Va. 1999) (describing how, during the
execution of a warrant to search a computer for evidence of computer hacking,
agents discovered child pornography and obtained a second warrant authorizing a
search of defendant’s computer files for child pornography).
222. For discussions of whether the plain-view exception to the warrant
requirement should extend to searches of digital information, see, e.g., Michael
Mestitz, Note, Unpacking Digital Containers: Extending Riley’s Reasoning to Digital
Files and Subfolders, 69 STAN. L. REV. 321 (2017); Andrew Vahid Moshirnia,

Separating Hard Fact from Hard Drive: A Solution for Plain View Doctrine in the
Digital Domain, 23 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 609 (2010); James Saylor, Note, Computers
as Castles: Preventing the Plain View Doctrine from Becoming a Vehicle for
Overbroad Digital Searches, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2809 (2011).
223. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
224. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 703 (1981); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
225. See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 246; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147
(1925).
226. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336 (2000); Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Dunloy, 584 F.2d 6, 10–11 (2d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Scolnick, 392 F.2d 320, 326 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Howell, 240 F.2d
149, 156 (3d Cir. 1956).
228. See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016) (finding that
the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk
driving but that blood tests are significantly more intrusive and, thus, require either a
warrant or some showing of exigent circumstances); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435,
465 (2013) (permitting warrantless collection of a DNA sample as a negligible
intrusion by rubbing a swab on the inside of a person’s cheek); Cupp v. Murphy, 412
U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (upholding scraping underneath a suspect’s fingernails to find
evidence of a crime as a “very limited intrusion”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
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enumerated exceptions, work to ensure that such encroachments are
necessary. 229 In a recent and unrelated case dealing with modern
technology, the Supreme Court observed that searches of digital
devices raise new issues of scope given the amount and variety of data
they can hold. 230 Here, however, there were warrants to search the
computer because of particular and articulated wrongdoing stored
thereon, which rendered the privacy incursion permissible. The
Supreme Court in Riley did not find that the information stored
within a cell phone was categorically immune from search; rather, the
Court articulated that “[o]ur answer to the question of what police
must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is
accordingly simple — get a warrant.” 231 Ganias deals with that latter
situation, as the agents did get a warrant. Yet, there is no contention
in Riley that a phone or a similar digital device could not be searched
after a warrant has been obtained — or that there is then a ticking
clock for its review.
Thus, having obtained a warrant and having searched Ganias’s
hard drives, the government could not have violated Ganias’s
expectations of privacy. 232 Once the devices were seized — or, rather,
imaged — Ganias could have had no expectation that the government
would not look through those materials. 233 He also would not have

757, 770 (1966) (“Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings,
and, absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human
body are concerned.”); Sec. & Law Enf’t Emps., Dist. Council 82, Am. Fed’n of
State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 208 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding that a search warrant based on probable cause must be obtained before
conducting a visual body-cavity search).
229. The warrant requirement has been described by the Supreme Court as “[t]he
bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection,” see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
164 (1978), and there is no reason to believe that it cannot continue to serve in that
role, whether the object to be searched is a digital device or a home.
230. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–90 (2014).
231. Id. at 2495.
232. An “expectation of privacy” has been a bedrock principle of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence since Justice Harlan first enunciated the idea fifty years
ago. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
233. See, e.g., State v. Munro, 124 P.3d 1221, 1225 (Or. 2005) (“Here, the warrant
lawfully authorized the seizure of the videotape and the invasion of defendant’s
privacy interest in its contents. Once the police seized the videotape under the
authority of the warrant, any privacy interest that defendant had in the content of the
videotape was destroyed by the authority of the warrant permitting the examination
and exhibition of the contents of the videotape. Until such time as defendant
regained lawful possession of the videotape, he had no remaining privacy interest in
its contents that he could assert . . . . Once they lawfully had seized the videotape,
nothing prevented the police from examining the contents of the videotape as often
as they deemed necessary.”).
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been privy to what the government was looking at and when,
irrespective of whether or not he was the target of the investigation.
Thus, from his perspective, the agents could have discovered
incriminating evidence immediately. His privacy interests in his
property were found to have been outweighed by the showing of
probable cause that there was specific evidence of wrongdoing.
Therefore, if Ganias did not have any expectation of privacy, why
would the seizure, searches, and retention be unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment? The protection he is given is that a sitting judge
made sure that she believed there was probable cause before the
search took place. This is the standard, whether it is a search of a
digital document or of an intimate diary. Judges are the gatekeepers
of privacy before law enforcement is allowed to infringe upon it, and
the subsequent infringement is not per se unreasonable because it is
an infringement. The agents did nothing wrong, and the court should
not have been afraid to say affirmatively that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation. Indeed, given that digital data were involved,
it was all the more imperative for the court to understand the nuances
of such data and articulate a clear and suitable standard.
In this case, the historical process for guarding against unwarranted
government intrusions was clearly followed. There was an authorized
search, which amounts to a justified invasion of Ganias’s private data.
Fruitful results were uncovered for use in a criminal prosecution.
Numerous and legitimate reasons called for the retention of that data
for said prosecution. Separately, additional facts supported an
additional warrant, a further — but still lawful — intrusion into
Ganias’s privacy. Once more, fruitful results were discovered and
were then used in a criminal prosecution. The agents could not have
been expected to subdivide the data or more narrowly shape their
efforts than they did, and their reasonable efforts satisfy the Fourth
Amendment and ultimately amounted to quality police work. Rather
than sidestep the issue, the court should have just said as much.
Permitting the police to use the additional evidence gives them a
valuable tool to prove their cases and stop criminal actors. It provides
an extra mechanism to protect public safety, with no added risk to
privacy; the police have already conducted the search pursuant to a
valid warrant. Subsequently denying the use of powerful evidence
legitimately uncovered during a lawful search serves no deterrent
purpose, misunderstands the nature of digital storage media, and
needlessly rewards the malevolent actors.
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CONCLUSION
To guard against governmental abuses and general rummaging
through persons, houses, papers, and effects, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits the issuance of a warrant absent probable cause and a
particularized description of the authorized search. 234 The Fourth
Amendment also requires that all searches and seizures are
reasonable. 235 Thus, a reasonable search can be accomplished by
securing a warrant, based on probable cause and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the thing to be seized. 236
In Ganias, the government obtained a warrant meeting these
requirements and reasonably seized evidence, pursuant to the
accepted two-step process for electronically stored information. The
2003 warrant authorized the lawful seizure of not merely particular
records or data but the hard drives themselves — or, alternatively, the
creation of full mirror images of the drives. 237 The warrant permitted
their removal from the search premises for subsequent forensic
examination. It set no additional limits on the government’s retention
of the drives than it did on any of the other evidence it authorized the
agents to seize. 238 The government then reasonably used the fruits of
that warrant, limited in scope, for the investigation for which it had
been issued.
The government subsequently set forth independent information in
a new affidavit and obtained a second warrant, also based on
probable cause and describing what would be searched and what it
hoped to seize. That second search was also fruitful, resulting in an
additional prosecution and conviction. Throughout this process, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment were in place, and its
requirements were met multiple times. The application of the Fourth
Amendment should not be altered just because digital data is
involved. If the technology is faced head on, it is clear that the
government acted appropriately. As such, and given that digital data
is only becoming more pervasive and more relevant in court cases, the
Second Circuit should not have dodged the issue, offering extensive
dicta but no guiding precedent. Overcomplicating the technology can

234. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As discussed above, particularity requires the
warrant to (1) identify the offense for which there is probable cause; (2) describe the
place or thing to be searched; and (3) specify the object(s) to be seized in connection
with designated crimes. See supra text accompanying notes 79–89.
235. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
236. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
237. See Search Warrant, supra note 33.
238. See id.
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overcomplicate the result, but if the courts would look past the mere
skeuomorphism of computers, it is clear how a coherent physical item
seized pursuant to a search warrant should be treated. Lawfully
possessed items should be retained throughout the pendency of the
investigation and prosecution, and if some legitimate purpose latter
arises — within whatever relevant statutes of limitation that may
apply — then the courts should be free to authorize further searches
so long as they can be supported by sufficient probable cause — the
controlling constitutional safeguard since the founding.
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APPENDIX: A BASIC EXPLANATION OF COMPUTER DATA STORAGE
Hard drives are a complex innovation, and, generally speaking,
most people are not aware of the inner workings of their computers,
let alone the storage medium itself. However, to explain it simply,
computers operate using binary language, which means that
everything is represented by either a 1 or a 0. 239 Each 1 or 0 is known
as a “bit.” 240 Groups of eight bits are known as “bytes” and are the
smallest unit of memory in computer architecture, representing a
single number, letter, or character. 241 Computers use standardized
encoding to translate human-readable language into binary, and vice
versa. 242 Thus, when any file is saved to a hard drive, the computer is
actually writing sequences of 1s and 0s (representing magnetic
charges) to the disk, which, together, constitute a file. 243
Hard drives generally create and read data through
electromagnetism. 244 Traditional hard drives consist of metal platters

239. See SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 15–16.
240. Id.
241. Id. To illustrate, an uppercase letter “A” is represented in binary as the byte
01000001, while a lowercase letter “a” is 01100001. The number “1” is represented as
00110001, and a question mark is actually 00111111.
242. Id. The American Standard Code for Information Interchange (“ASCII”) is
the encoding scheme for the English language. ASCII Tables are charts that show
characters and their corresponding computer language representations—such as
binary, decimal, and hexadecimal, which use the mathematical bases 2, 10, and 16,
respectively. These charts are readily available online, as are websites that will
translate from one language into another. See, e.g., ASCII Table, RAPIDTABLES,
https://www.rapidtables.com/code/text/ascii-table.html [https://perma.cc/4U22-A9Y9];
BINARY HEX CONVERTERS, www.binaryhexconverter.com [https://perma.cc/X6ASSMV6]; ASCII, Decimal, Hexadecimal, Octal, and Binary Conversion Table, IBM,
https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/ssw_aix_72/com.ibm.aix.networkc
omm/conversion_table.htm [https://perma.cc/8RRN-F9QM].
243. SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 15–16. Readers can see this operation in action
for themselves by creating a simple text file. Using a plain text editor such as
Notepad (not a more advanced word processor, such as Microsoft Word), type a
short phrase or message. Then, count the number of characters (including spaces)
and save and close the document. Now, right-click on the file and view its properties.
The file’s size on the hard drive, indicated by the number bytes, should be the same
as the number of characters in the file. This is because each character is one byte.
On your hard drive, that file is actually stored as the sequence of 1s and 0s (bits) that
translate to the ASCII characters of the file (bytes). The total file size is the number
of bytes that the file requires on the hard drive. Rather than view the files on the
hard drive as the user sees them, forensic tools can look at the raw data, the actual 1s
and 0s on the hard drive that constitute the file.
244. Id. at 19. The majority of today’s computer hard drives are magnetic drives,
so this Note limits its discussion to traditional drives and does not address the advent
of solid-state hard drives (“SSDs”), which are more advanced and operate entirely
differently.
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that rapidly revolve around a rod known as a spindle. 245 As these
physical disks spin, a movable arm with a special read/write head
hovers over the platters, with a microscopic gap between them. 246 In
“write mode,” the arm will magnetize points on the platter, which, in
“read mode,” are read as 1s. 247 Likewise, non-magnetized areas are
read as 0s. 248 In essence, hard drives are simply spinning disks that
are either raised or not along concentric tracks, with the resulting
“topography” read just as a record player “reads” the grooves of a
record. 249
Computers store information in defined areas on the hard disk
called sectors, which are the smallest “buckets” for data. 250 Each
sector can typically hold up to 512 bytes of data — but no more.251
Thus, computers store data as clusters — groupings of multiple
sectors — which are the smallest physical units that can be allocated
for data. 252 If a file’s size is larger than the computer’s cluster storage
capacity, the system will assign additional clusters as needed, even if
the final one is not fully used. 253 Thus, a file may be allocated to two
clusters, filling the first and partially filling the second. In the second
cluster, however, only the minimum number of sectors are used,
rounding up to the next full sector. 254 However, the entirely unused
sectors in the cluster, though allocated to the file, are not written with
any new data. 255
Computer file systems 256 are responsible for keeping track of this
data, identifying what space is free, what space has been used, and

245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See CASEY, supra note 205, at 447 (“Data are recorded on a platter in
concentric circles (like the annual rings of a tree trunk) called tracks.” (emphasis in
original)).
250. See SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 25.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. If the data from the file itself fills only part of a sector in a cluster, the
remainder of that 512-byte sector is filled with zeros. In other words, only whole
sectors can be written at a time.
255. This process can result in the recovery of data from so-called “slack space,”
which is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 266–69.
256. There are a number of different types of file systems. FAT, or File Allocation
Table, was used on older systems and is still used today on flash drives or similar
devices. NTFS, or New Technology File System, was introduced with Windows XP
and is still used today. HSF+, or Hierarchical File System, is used in Apple products.
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where exactly each file is located. 257 The file system categorizes all
space on a hard drive as either allocated or unallocated. 258 The
computer user, through the operating system (such as Windows or
Mac OS), can only view active files in allocated space. 259 Anything in
unallocated space (such as a file after it has been “deleted”) is
invisible to the operating system, though, on the hard drive itself, it is
simply marked as “not in use” — which does not mean that the space
is empty. 260
Latent data refers to data that has been deleted or partially
overwritten. 261 Essentially, when a user deletes a file, the computer
eliminates the entry in its file system table — where used/unused
clusters and their locations are recorded — making the file invisible to
the computer user by ordinary means and the physical space where it
resides available for use when the computer is saving future files.262
However, until a given cluster is reused, the data itself remains
untouched and can be recovered by forensic examiners. 263
To complicate matters further, a single file is not necessarily stored
in one place and may be scattered across various clusters on the hard
drive platters. 264 This is why the file system not only tracks what
areas of the hard drive have been used but also notes where a
particular file is stored 265; a single document or photo might be saved
in contiguous clusters, or it could be fragmented and saved in a
number of non-contiguous clusters. 266 Additionally, when data are

Though there are some nuances among the three, they all serve the same essential
function. See id. at 23.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 24. In essence, the computer logs “this area is used, do not write here”
or “this space is available, data can be stored here.”
259. Id. at 22, 24.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 22.
262. Id. at 22–24. Most modern operating systems, irrespective of their differences,
merely erase the “pointer” to the file so it no longer appears in directory listings.
However, they do not erase the actual data. Sammons uses the analogy of a book
index, which, like the file system, lists the information and its location. He explains,
“Using the book analogy again, deleting a file would be akin to removing the entry
from the book’s index. Although our subject is no longer referenced in the index, the
page and all its contents are still in the book, intact and untouched.” Id. at 24.
263. Id. at 24 (“Deleted files will sit there until they’re overwritten by more
data . . . . With the massive amount of storage space available on today’s hard drives,
a file stands a good chance of never being overwritten.”).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 24–25.
Some readers may have used the system tool “Disk
Defragmenter” to analyze their hard drives and move disparate file pieces closer
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written to a space on a hard drive that had previously housed a nowdeleted file, it is possible that the new file will not use the entirety of
the cluster. 267 If the prior file filled more sectors than the new file
uses, the last few sectors of the cluster allocated to the new file may
actually contain the data from the prior file — which will not be
overwritten since the file system marks the whole cluster as in use.268
In computer forensics lingo, this is known as data in slack space, the
difference between the space that is assigned and the space that is
actually filled. 269 For both deleted files that have not yet been
overwritten at all or for remnants of files that have only been partially
overwritten and persist in slack space, forensic examiners can use
standard forensic tools to recover them. 270
Examiners can use a process called “carving” to extract data from
undifferentiated blocks of raw data in unallocated space. 271
Examiners can search through the sequences of bits and bytes that
make up files and look for file headers and footers, which identify the
files and mark the beginnings and ends of the data. 272 Users are
unlikely to contemplate the amount of revealing information that is
unintentionally created or that is tracked by hidden system files, such
as data in a hibernation file, 273 swap file, 274 registry or system logs,275

together so the data can be read more quickly by the actuator arm moving over the
disks. Because it is a mechanical process, when pieces of a file are stored in multiple
locations, it takes longer for the arm head to move to and read each cluster to
reassemble the file when a user wants to open it. Defragmenting moves the pieces
closer together so the file can be made available more quickly.
267. Id. at 25.
268. Id. at 25–29.
269. Id. at 25, 28.
270. Id. at 26–27.
271. See CASEY, supra note 205, at 445–46. This technique can be conducted
manually or with a tool and involves identifying known file signatures within the
morass of 1s and 0s. Relevant fragments are carved out, just as a sculpture is “carved
out” of a solid stone.
272. See id.; SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 17, 66.
273. When a user places his or her machine into hibernation, all of the temporary
and volatile data in Random-Access Memory (“RAM”) is written to the hard drive
as the file “hiberfil.sys” so it can be retained while the device is completely powered
down. The effects of this do not simply vanish when the user starts the machine
again, as data written to a hard drive are more persistent, preserving the active
session far longer than the user would presume and making the data more likely to be
recovered by investigators. See CASEY, supra note 205, at 385, 497.
274. Swap files enable a computer to run more processes, supplementing its
physical RAM by temporarily storing information that is not being used on the hard
drive itself, “swapping” or “paging” data into and out of RAM as required. See id. at
384, 456, 496–97.
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restore points, 276 or a thumbnail cache. 277 Even lack of data could be
telling, as specific patterns on the bit-level might suggest an attempt
at concealment 278 and signal to investigators to look for other signs of
data concealment. 279 All of this information is contained in the raw
sequence of 1s and 0s — not the visible files — and can be
tremendously useful in furthering an investigation.
With respect to the files in allocated space that the user can see, the
file system maintains various metadata about the data. 280 It logs the
dates and times that each file or folder was last modified, accessed,
and created — collectively known as “MAC times” — as well as
information about the author or user. Similarly, the web browsers a
user installs to access the Internet can store a great deal of detailed
information about the user’s activity and habits, tracking information
about recently visited websites, downloads, or search terms
entered. 281 As with latent data, metadata regarding active data could

275. On Windows computers, the registry serves as a central database of the
computer’s settings and configurations. It can reveal information about programs
that were installed, terms searched, recently opened documents or program,
password information, user profiles and their permission settings, attached media and
devices, and many other details. See id. at 535–38; SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 68.
276. Restore points “are snapshots of key system settings and configuration at a
specific moment in time” that can be created automatically upon certain triggering
events (such as before installing new software), at regularly scheduled intervals, or
manually by the user. SAMMONS, supra note 121, at 79. Microsoft hides them from
the user and includes metadata about when they were taken. See id. As a result, the
user might not have thought to delete them, so they can reveal valuable information
that does not exist on the live system and can show exactly when that data existed on
the machine.
277. Windows automatically creates thumbnails, small versions of larger
photographs, to make it easier to browse the pictures on a computer. Because these
files remain after the original images have been deleted—and users might not be
aware that they even exist—thumbnails can serve as evidence to prove that the
pictures existed at some point on the system. See id. at 78.
278. The appearance of “normal” bits—what the hard drive would look like after
everyday use—is somewhat random and inconsistent. If a distinct pattern appears in
a particular area of data, it could indicate that the user made a concerted effort to
permanently overwrite what had been there with random new data. A forensic
examination could reveal telltale signs of the presence or use of data-wiping tools
that may have been installed in an attempt to make data unrecoverable. This alone
could serve as valuable evidence, or it could serve as a clue for the analyst for how to
proceed to try to recover evidence. See id. at 96.
279. See id. at 80.
280. See id. at 75–76.
281. See CASEY, supra note 205, at 538–42 (“Accessing the Internet leaves a wide
variety of information on a computer including Web sites, contents viewed, and
newsgroups accessed . . . . [S]ome Windows systems maintain a log of when the
modem was used . . . . When an individual first views a Web page, the browser caches
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be lost or altered were files to be removed by a means other than
careful forensic imaging. Such loss of evidence could mean the
difference between a case going unsolved and a criminal defendant
being brought to justice.

the page and associated elements . . . . The number of times that a given page was
visited is recorded in some Web browser history databases.”).

